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1
Introduction
Sisay Asefa
Western Michigan University

This collection is based on the papers presented at the 2007–2008
Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar series held at Western Michigan University. These papers address the issue of globalization with a special
emphasis on its impact on poverty. The dawning of the twenty-first
century is a propitious time to examine this issue. Advances in transportation and, especially, telecommunications have imposed virtual
synchronicity on nations. Information and communication flows are
virtually instantaneous. However, wide differences in cultures, political systems, languages, and ethnicities impose barriers to optimal use
of the technological advances that have occurred. Extreme variation in
the international distributions of wealth, income, and poverty remain as
enormous social problems to be addressed.
The general perspective of the economists who have contributed to
this collection of papers is that expanding “flows” between countries
is the appropriate direction for economies both in terms of accelerating growth and reducing inequalities. These flows include international
trade and capital, migration, remittances, and foreign aid. But in addition to these hard commodities and dollars, there are flows of ideas,
knowledge, and technical assistance. Of course, as one of the authors
reminds us, appropriate intellectual property rights need to be enforced
concomitantly with the flow of ideas and knowledge.
The book begins with the chapter by Ian Goldin and Kenneth A.
Reinert, who explore how globalization in the structure of trade and
capital flows in its various forms (foreign direct investment, portfolio
investment, and commercial bank lending) affect poverty. They also
discuss the effect of foreign aid, international migration, and remittances, including the global flow of ideas in the form of knowledge and
information.
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Goldin and Reinert offer a historical view of globalization and
describe three distinct stages of modern globalization, the first of which
dates back to approximately 1870. In discussing the historical relationship among these three stages, they note that globalization and global
poverty can be either positively or negatively related to each other.
From 1870 to 1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression, globalization and global poverty increased together. However, the retreat
from globalization during the Great Depression and World War II was
accompanied by a continued increase in global poverty. A key public
policy challenge facing humankind, they say, is to eliminate this stillprominent level of extreme poverty.
Goldin and Reinert write that while globalization has the potential
to be a vehicle for shared growth, prosperity, and reductions in poverty, that potential is not yet being adequately realized. They conclude
their chapter with several recommendations to improve the effects of
globalization.
Chapter 3 by Susan Pozo emphasizes that globalization through
migration is a powerful global force with potential benefits for individuals and community out-migrants. Pozo discusses the role of current remittances and how these forms of capital inflows to developing
countries have the potential to reduce sudden stops or shocks. In other
words, countries that experience large inflows of remittances appear
less vulnerable to economic recessions from sudden withdrawal of capital, assuming these inflows are motivated by altruism. Altruism inflows
to developing countries are countercyclical, reducing the damage that
foreign investors may impart when they perceive sudden shock in poor
performance and withdraw financial resources.
Pozo reminds us that free flows of capital where it is abundant
should earn low returns to areas where it is abundant and earn higher
returns where it scarce, as in developing countries. Globalization driven
both by trade and capital flows generally leads to a positive sum outcome, and not a zero sum game. The same idea is true for migration,
which involves the flow of human capital. She concludes by arguing
that despite political impediments to labor migration, migration and
other forms of globalization driven by technical changes, trade, and
capital flows are likely to lead to growth of the world economy with the
potential to reduce global poverty.
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Chapter 4 by Joseph Joyce explores the impact of globalization on
income and wealth inequality. Joyce reviews the evidence on the determinants of disparities in per capita income with a focus on the institutions that affect globalization. He implies that globalization can be better managed to benefit the poor. The United States and other industrial
countries have a major responsibility to help promote globalization with
a human face. In particular, the greatest challenge of global poverty and
inequality exists in Africa and the Middle East in the coming century,
with symptoms that pose serious global challenges: deadly conflicts,
human rights abuses, terrorism, rebellion, and dictatorships. Overcoming these challenges, Joyce says, will make a significant contribution to
globalization and result in global peace, stability, poverty alleviation,
and human security.
Linda Tesar, in Chapter 5, examines how the composition of global
and financial flows has changed and the role of the markets in the process. She discusses the history of financial flows and their responses
to the Washington Consensuses I and II. Washington I refers to policy
recommendations by Washington-based global institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury,
which recommended to developing countries to liberalize market prices
by “getting prices right.” This policy later proved too limited and led to
the Washington II Consensus of “getting institutions right.”
Tesar shows the change in composition for global financial flows
to emerging markets during the post–financial crisis period. External
development finance is now more likely to take the form of a sale of
domestic assets, with control rights shifting to the acquiring firm, which
is a natural response to weak institutions in emerging markets. While
control of foreign subsidiaries allows both for capital flow and for protection of property rights of the acquiring firm, it is not a substitute for
strong institutions that would extend to all firms in emerging markets.
The upshot is this: getting institutions right is critical to attracting FDI
in developing economies.
In Chapter 6, Lisa Cook investigates the issue of intellectual property rights based on evidence from plant patents from 1977 to 2007 for
selected developing countries. She addresses the problem of the provisions of Trade Property Rights Intellectual Protections in developing
countries. With weak capacity to protect intellectual property rights at
home, low-income countries are robbed of their innovations, including
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cultural and historical property asset rights. Cook explores the question
of how a developing country may respond to the challenge of greater
intellectual property protection, and whether foreign patent offices have
become complements and substitutes for domestic patent offices.
The book concludes with Chapter 7 by Hadi Esfahani, who asks
whether we as a society and as individuals are developing the right
skills and procedures to deal with the challenges of new global opportunities. To address this question, Esfahani discusses previous trends
in globalization, which have consisted of greater integration of world
markets with the help of technological progress and improved governance across countries. He then turns to future trends in globalization,
and says that policy reforms are unlikely to make countries uniform in
terms of governance and regulation, but they will bring about greater
harmony. Esfahani concludes his chapter by discussing the types of
skills necessary to compete in a future global economy.
One of the goals of this lecture series is that reading these thoughtprovoking papers will stimulate action. It will stimulate the reader to
search for additional resources on the issues raised. It will stimulate the
reader to bring a more well-grounded understanding to debates about
globalization. It will stimulate readers to confront xenophobic proscriptions to let other countries solve their own problems. Like many aspects
of progress, globalization has great potential and has its downsides.
The goal of collecting papers that analyze issues of globalization is to
inform readers about both.

2
Can Globalization Help?
Ian Goldin
Oxford University
Kenneth A. Reinert
George Mason University

Globalization broadly refers to the expansion of worldwide linkages within and increasing interdependence of human activity in the
economic, social, cultural, political, technological, and even biological
spheres. The areas in which globalization operates can interact with one
another. For instance, while HIV/AIDS is a biological phenomenon,
it interacts with economic, social, cultural, political, and technological
forces at global, regional, national, and community levels. The relationship between globalization and development is not well understood,
and disagreement regarding this relationship abounds. Globalization is,
to many, the best means of bringing prosperity to the greatest number of
people all around the world. For others, it represents an important cause
of global poverty.
The five economic dimensions of globalization examined here are
trade, finance, aid, migration, and ideas. Whereas trade is the exchange
of goods and services among the countries of the world, capital flows
involve the exchange of assets or financial instruments among these
countries. Foreign aid involves the transfer of loans and grants among
countries, as well as technical assistance or capacity building. Migration
takes place when people move between countries, either temporarily or
permanently, to seek education and employment or to escape adverse
political environments. Ideas represent the broadest globalization phenomenon. They involve the generation and international transmission
of intellectual constructs in areas such as technology, management, or
governance.
One can hope that these dimensions of economic globalization
would contribute to development and poverty alleviation, and this is
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indeed often the case. In other instances, however, the link between
globalization and development breaks down. As we will argue here,
there are no statements regarding the relationship between globalization and development that are both simple and accurate. Rather, statements regarding this relationship are necessarily complex if they are to
be accurate.1

A HIsTORICAL VIEW
Economic historians date the modern era of globalization to approximately 1870. The period from 1870 to 1914 is often considered to be
the birth of the modern world economy, which, by some measures, was
as integrated as it is today. Historians have observed that, from the point
of view of capital flows, the late 1800s were an extraordinary time.2
The global integration of capital markets was facilitated by advances
in rail and ship transportation and in telegraph communication. European colonial systems were at their highest stages of development, and
migration was at a historical high point in relation to the global population of the time.
This first modern stage of globalization was followed by two additional stages, one from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s and another from
the mid-1970s to the present. These, however, were preceded by World
War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. During these events,
many aspects of globalization were reversed as the world experienced
increased conflict, nationalism, and patterns of economic autarky. To
some extent, then, the second and third modern stages of globalization
merely involved regaining lost levels of international integration.
The second modern stage of globalization began at the end of World
War II. It was accompanied by a global, economic regime developed by
the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 establishing the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), what was to become the World Bank, and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This stage of globalization involved an increase in capital flows from the United States,
as well as a U.S.-inspired production system that relied on exploiting
economies of scale in manufacturing and the advance of U.S.-based
multinational enterprises (MNEs).
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This second stage also involved some reduction of trade barriers
under the auspices of GATT. Developing countries were not highly
involved in this liberalization, however. In export products of interest
to developing countries (agriculture, textiles, and clothing), a system of
nontariff measures in rich countries evolved. Also, a set of key developing countries, especially those in Latin America, pursued import substitution industrialization with their own trade barriers.3 These developments, along with the Cold War, suppressed the integration of many
developing countries into the world trading system.
The third modern stage of globalization began in the late 1970s.
This stage followed the demise of monetary relationships developed
at the Bretton Woods Conference and involved the emergence of the
newly industrialized countries of East Asia, especially Japan, Taiwan
(China), and the Republic of Korea. Rapid technological progress, particularly in transportation, communication, and information technology, began to dramatically lower the costs of moving goods, capital,
people, and ideas across the globe.4
What has been the historical relationship among these three stages
of modern globalization and development? A partial view is found in
Figure 2.1. This figure combines a single measure of globalization—
exports as a percentage of world gross domestic product (GDP)—with
a single measure of poverty—the number of extremely dollar poor people—in a time series from 1870 to 1998. What is clear from this figure
is that, historically, globalization and global poverty can be either positively related or negatively related to each other. From 1870 through
1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression, globalization (trade)
and global poverty increased together. However, the retreat from globalization during the Great Depression and World War II was accompanied by a continued increase in global poverty. This can be seen from
the 1950 data in the figure showing that, when exports as a percentage
of GDP had declined nearly back to the 1870 level, extreme poverty
reached a peak of approximately 1.4 billion persons.
As seen in Figure 2.1, the increase in globalization as measured by
trade in the second and third stages of modern globalization has been
associated with a gradual decline in extreme poverty to approximately
1.1 billion people. During these stages, globalization and poverty have
been negatively associated with each other, albeit mildly so. A key public
policy challenge facing humankind is to eliminate this still-prominent
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Reinert Figure
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level of extreme poverty. Understanding how to do this requires a deeper understanding of the links between globalization and poverty.

TRADE
Of all aspects of globalization, international trade is held out as the
great hope for poverty alleviation.5 Trade can contribute to poverty alleviation by expanding markets, promoting competition, and raising productivity, each of which has the potential to increase the real incomes
of poor people. But it would be a mistake to rely on trade liberalization
alone as a means of reducing poverty.6 A more comprehensive approach
is needed that addresses multiple economic and social challenges simultaneously and that emphasizes the expansion of poor people’s capabili-
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ties, especially in the areas of health and education.7 Nevertheless, trade
has some vital roles to play.
Since the mid-1980s, developing countries have increased their
global trade exports significantly, even in services where their comparative advantage is typically seen as weak. For various reasons,
not the least of which are trade barriers maintained by rich countries,
developing country agricultural (primary) exports have been stagnant
(see Figure 2.2). There is also a divergence of export experience across
developing countries, with Africa’s share of world exports declining
over time.
International trade is a means of expanding markets, and market
expansion can help generate employment and incomes for poor people.
Comparisons are often made between the wages of workers in poorcountry export industries and the wages of workers in developed countries. In these comparisons, the wages of workers in developing-country
export industries often appear to be very low. Consequently, trade has
often been identified as poverty worsening. However, the more releFigure 2.2 Nominal Exports of Developing Countries
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vant comparison is between the wages of export sector workers with
agricultural day laborers, both in the same developing country. Here it
can often be seen that the alternative of agricultural day labor is much
worse. It is precisely this type of income comparison that draws workers into export industries.8
It must be kept in mind that not all export activity is equal from
the point of view of raising the incomes of poor people. Exporting can
best contribute to poverty alleviation when it supports labor-intensive
production, human capital accumulation (both education and health),
and technological learning. In addition, the incomes of poor individuals
depend on buoyant and sustainable export incomes, which in turn are
dependent on export prices.
International trade is also a means of promoting competition, and
in many instances, this can help poor people. Increased competition
lowers the real costs of both consumption and production. For example, domestic monopolies charge monopoly prices that can be significantly above competitive prices. The competition introduced by imports
erodes market power, lowering prices. These procompetitive effects of
trade can expand household budgets and lower the costs of production.
The latter can have additional employment effects that are advantageous to poor individuals by lowering nonwage costs in labor-intensive
production activities. Procompetitive effects can also arise in the case
of monopsony power. Here, sellers (small farmers, for example) to the
monopsony buyer are able to obtain higher prices for their goods as the
buying power of the monopsonist is eroded.
There is some evidence that international trade can promote productivity in a country, and it is possible that productivity increases can
in turn support the incomes of poor people.9 Exports of all types or in
all countries cannot generate positive productivity effects, but in certain instances they can. Export postures can place the exporting firms
in direct contact with discerning international customers, facilitating
upgrading processes. There is no consensus within international economics on the extent of these upgrading effects, but they are present in
some cases.10
There are occasions when international trade can have direct health
and safety impacts on poor individuals—impacts that can be beneficial
or detrimental. Perhaps most importantly, improving the health outcomes of poor people usually involves imports of medical products. It

Can Globalization Help? 11

is simply not possible for most small, developing countries to produce
the entire range of even basic medical supplies, no less more advanced
medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. However, many developing
countries import large amounts of weaponry and export sexual services,
both of which can have dramatically negative outcomes for the health
and safety of poor individuals.11 In addition, the production processes
of some export industries can adversely affect the health of workers in
those industries, and a small but important amount of trade involves
hazardous waste dumping.

CAPITAL FLOWs
Private capital flows are an important resource for developing countries. They augment domestic savings and can contribute to investment,
growth, financial sector development, and technology transfer. However, there is also substantial evidence that capital flows entail potential
costs that are both much larger than in the case of trade and disproportionately carried by the poor. Additionally, it has become clear that not
all capital flows are the same in their benefit and cost characteristics.
For these reasons, the cost and benefit characteristics of distinct types of
capital flows must be considered in some detail.12 Here we distinguish
among foreign direct investment, equity portfolio investment, bond
finance, and commercial bank lending.
The financial markets involved in equity portfolio investment, bond
finance, and commercial bank lending are characterized by a number
of market failures. In normal circumstances, these imperfections tend
to contribute to a certain amount of market volatility, as shown in Figure 2.3. Under certain circumstances that are not fully understood (but
are particularly important in emerging economies), they can lead to
full-blown financial crises. Imperfections in financial markets appear
to be particularly problematic when commercial banks in developing
countries are given access to short-term, foreign lending sources.13 The
resulting problems have three causes. First, systems of financial intermediation in developing countries tend to rely heavily on the banking
sector, while other types of financial intermediation typically are being
underdeveloped. Second, developing countries have been encouraged
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Figure 2.3 Nominal Flows of Aid, FDI, Portfolio Investment, and
Remittances to Developing Countries
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to liberalize domestic financial markets, sometimes before systems of
prudential bank regulation and management are put in place. Third,
developing countries have sometimes prematurely liberalized their capital accounts.14 Consequently, care must be taken in managing evolving
financial systems and their access to international capital flows.
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can have positive impacts on poverty by creating employment, improving technology and human capital, and promoting competition. Not all kinds of FDI contribute in this
way, however, and some can adversely impact certain dimensions of
poverty through unsafe working conditions and environmental degradation. Nevertheless, as it pertains to poverty alleviation, FDI is the
most promising category of capital flows.15 As can be seen in Figure
2.3, these flows have risen substantially in recent years.
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Many developing countries lack access to the technologies available in developed countries, and hosting MNEs from developed countries is one way to potentially gain access to that technology. There are
limits to technology transfer, however. First, MNEs will employ the
technology that most suits their strategic needs and not the development needs of host countries. For example, MNEs can employ processes that are much more capital intensive than would be desired on
the basis of host-country employment considerations.16 Second, there is
a strong tendency for MNEs to conduct their research and development
in their home bases rather than in host countries.17
Despite these general limitations, in some important cases, MNEs
do transfer technology and establish significant relationships with hostcountry suppliers via backward linkages. If foreign MNE begins to
source inputs locally rather than by importing them, the host country
can gain a number of important benefits. First, employment can increase
since the sourced inputs represent new production. Second, production
technologies can be better adapted to local conditions since suppliers
are more likely to employ labor-intensive processes. Third, the MNE
can transfer state-of-the-art business practices and technologies to the
local suppliers. Fourth, it is possible that the local suppliers can coalesce
into a spatial cluster that supports innovation and upgrading.18
Another avenue through which MNEs can positively affect host
economies is through “spillovers” to other sectors of these economies. The evidence to date suggests that such spillovers do occur in
some circumstances and can be significant. However, in the words of
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), they are not “guaranteed, automatic,
or free.” What determines whether positive technology spillovers will
occur? Many factors are involved, and these include host country policies, MNE behavior, and industry characteristics. One key factor is the
capacity of local firms to absorb foreign technologies. Blomström and
Kokko (2003) suggest that learning is a key capacity that is responsive to various host country policies, and evidence presented in Tsang,
Nguyen, and Erramilli (2004) in the case of Vietnam supports this view.
There is some evidence that MNEs in Africa offer higher wages
than domestic firms (see te Velde and Morrissey [2003]). This effect is
more predominant for skilled than unskilled workers. FDI can therefore
have differential impacts that exclude unskilled workers. This can result
in what te Velde (2001) refers to as the “low-income low-skill trap.” All
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of these considerations point to the role of basic education and skills
development in making the most of FDI for poverty alleviation.19
The low-income countries as a whole are largely excluded from
global FDI flows. For example, in 2002, low-income countries received
only 2 percent of total FDI flows, with nearly half of this going to India
and Vietnam alone. For these countries, exclusion from this dimension
of globalization is a long-term concern.
Equity Portfolio Investment
There is evidence that capital inflows in the form of equity portfolio
investment might be more beneficial than both bond finance and commercial bank lending. For example, Reisen and Soto (2001) have examined the impact of all four capital inflows considered here on growth
for a sample of 44 countries. They find that FDI, considered above,
did indeed have a positive impact on economic growth. The most
positive growth impact, however, came from equity portfolio flows.
Bond finance, considered below, did not have any impact on growth,
and commercial bank lending, also considered below, had a negative
impact. These results suggest that equity inflows, along with FDI, could
play an especially positive role in growth, development, and poverty
alleviation.
Why can equity portfolio investment play a positive role in growth
and development, at least under some circumstances? Rousseau and
Wachtel (2000) summarize research on this question with four possibilities: 1) equity portfolio inflows are an important source of funds
for developing countries; 2) the development of equity markets helps
to provide an exit mechanism for venture capitalists, and this increases
entrepreneurial activity; 3) portfolio inflows assist developing countries to move from short-term finance to longer-term finance and help
to finance investment in projects that have economies of scale; and
4) the development of equity markets provides an informational mechanism evaluating the performance of domestic firms and can help provide incentives to managers to perform well.
With regard to volatility, there is some evidence that institutional
investors managing equity flows are less likely than banks to engage
in herd and contagion behavior.20 However, in general, equity markets
are underdeveloped in much of the developing world. For example,
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nearly the entire net portfolio equity inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa
are accounted for by one country alone: South Africa. The World Bank
(2004) summarizes the features of developing-country equity markets
as follows:
Market capitalization as a share of GDP in low-income countries
is about one-sixth of that in high-income countries . . . Stock exchanges in developing countries also tend to lag technologically
behind developed markets. Technology plays a major role in the
trading, clearance, and settlement processes; problems in those
areas can discourage sophisticated investors. Institutions that
supervise and support the operation of the stock exchange also
tend to be weaker in developing countries. (p. 95)

The development of equity markets in low- and middle-income
countries is more complex than it might first appear, however. This is
due to the increased globalization of financial services. Observers have
pointed to a set of domestic factors as being particularly important in
equity market development. These factors include sound macroeconomic policies, minimal degrees of technology, legal systems that protect shareholders, and open financial markets. However, as pointed out
by Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002), these are precisely
the factors that tend to promote the “migration” of equity exchange
out of developing countries to the major exchanges in financial capital
of developed countries. This migration process complicates standard
notions of equity market development. Steil (2001) has argued that the
way forward is to link local markets with global markets. However,
there might remain medium-sized firms with local information needs
that could benefit from some kind of domestic or regional equity market. This is an area that requires urgent attention for the development of
novel approaches.
Bond Finance and Commercial Bank Lending
In the minds of the financial world, there are significant differences
between portfolio equity investment and debt. This shows up in the fact
that, in the case of bankruptcy, debt is given priority over equity. This
tends to support the preference for debt over equity in markets, a preference that appears to be misplaced from a development and poverty alleviation perspective. With regard to commercial bank lending, Dobson
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and Hufbauer (2001) note that “bank lending may be more prone to run
than portfolio capital, because banks themselves are highly leveraged,
and they are relying on the borrower’s balance sheet to ensure repayment” (p. 47). The World Bank (2001) notes that “incentives are key to
limiting undue risk-taking and fraudulent behavior in the management
and supervision of financial intermediaries—especially banks that are
prone to costly failure” (p. 3).
What can be done to support the safe development of banking
sectors in low-income countries? Some of the necessary steps can be
thought of in terms of information, institutions, and incentives. With
regard to information, it is important for banks to embrace internationally sanctioned accounting and auditing procedures and to make the
results of these assessments available to the public. In the case of institutions or the rules of the “banking game,” risk management practices
(both credit and currency) must be sufficiently stringent, and prudential
regulation systems must be well developed. With regard to currency
risk, the World Bank (2004) notes that “particular care should be taken
to ensure that foreign-currency liabilities are appropriately hedged” (p.
30).21 These information and institutional safeguards are no small task
and inevitably cannot be achieved in the short term. Consequently, they
should be buttressed with incentive measures in the form of marketfriendly taxes on banking capital inflows. For example, Eichengreen
(1999) argues that “banks borrowing abroad should be required to put
up additional noninterest-bearing reserves with the central bank” (p.
117). Such taxes on short-term capital inflows in the form of variable
deposit requirements appear to be important to prevent destabilizing
episodes of overborrowing.22
To summarize, debt flows in the form of bond finance and commercial bank lending appear to have different properties than equity
flows in the form of FDI and portfolio equity investment. They are more
prone to the imperfect behaviors that characterize financial markets and
do not appear to have positive growth effects as large as those associated with equity flows. Consequently, utilization of debt finance must
be cautious and sufficiently hedged against exchange rate risks.
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AID
It has been relatively recently that governments began to provide
financial and technical assistance to foreign countries. The purpose
of this assistance has varied and has included geopolitical objectives,
stimulating economic development, ameliorating poverty, promoting
political outcomes, and ensuring civil stability. Although foreign aid
is often visualized in terms of financial “handouts” by rich countries to
the world’s poorest inhabitants, the truth is significantly more complex.
Indeed, contrary to popular perception, low-income countries generally receive less than half of total aid flows. Much of the remainder is
made up by flows to middle-income countries, and some high-income
countries of strategic interest receive significant amounts of assistance.
Foreign aid, or official development assistance (ODA), as it is technically known, is composed of a wide range of financial and nonfinancial instruments used in support of growth and poverty-reduction
efforts. The transfer of financial resources is an important part of development assistance, but finance is only one of the instruments used to
support development. Nonfinancial forms of assistance include tangible grants of machinery or equipment and less tangible contributions
such as the provision of technical analysis, advice, or capacity building,
including trade-related capacity building. Such forms of assistance are
vital, especially in environments where finance is not likely to contribute to poverty reduction, such as early in postconflict situations or
where institutions are particularly weak.
As is evident in Figure 2.3, since the 1990s, FDI and portfolio flows
have dwarfed the historically recent flow of aid. For example, development aid in 2005 (US$106 billion) totaled only slightly over one-third
of FDI in developing countries (US$281 billion). In terms of historical
availability, flows of aid saw an initial rise from 1945 to 1960 but then
increased only slowly from the 1960s until around 1990. From then
until 2001, they dropped to only 0.2 percent of the GDP of high-income
countries. In the last four or so years, this trend has been reversed, with
ODA reaching a record high in 2005 and many countries committing
themselves to doubling aid budgets by 2010. But only 5 of the 22 highincome countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee
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that pledged 0.7 percent of their GDP to foreign aid actually met this
goal as of 2005.
In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals signaled a renewed
push for increased aid flows and better aid effectiveness, and there has
been significant recent progress in increasing the impact of aid. Indeed,
the estimated poverty-reduction productivity of ODA is significantly
better than it was in the early 1990s (Collier and Dollar 2004).23 When
all aid is lumped together, some analyses have found no clear relationship between aid and growth or poverty reduction (see, for example,
Boone [1996]). But not all aid is aimed directly at poverty reduction,
nor has aid always been provided in ways that will maximize growth.
Moreover, because aid is often provided to help countries cope with
external shocks, even if aid is reasonably well designed and allocated,
the positive impact of such aid may be obscured by the magnitude of
the shocks. Disaster relief, for example, is not aimed directly at longterm poverty reduction, and thus it is no surprise that such aid is not
correlated with that result.24 However, it does achieve its goal of helping
to avert famine or assisting countries to recover from natural disasters.
Donors initially placed too much emphasis on the role of what were
often isolated projects, neglecting the quality of the overall country
environment for growth, a mistake that adjustment or (policy-based)
aid was intended to overcome. Additionally, as mentioned above, aid
was sometimes allocated for purely strategic reasons, with growth and
poverty reduction in these cases being distinct secondary concerns, if
they were concerns at all. Given this diversity of motives, it is not surprising that aid did not always have the hoped-for effects on growth and
poverty reduction.
The adjustment programs that came into their own in partial
response to the macroeconomic imbalances of the 1970s had their own
problems. Donors incorrectly believed that conditionality on loans and
grants could substitute for country ownership. Too often, governments
receiving aid were not truly committed to reforms. Moreover, neither
donors nor governments focused sufficiently on poverty in designing
the adjustment programs. In many countries, donors underestimated
the importance of governance, institutional reforms, and social investments. Prescriptions for reform were too formulaic, ignoring the central
need for country specificity. As a result, weak governance and institu-
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tions reduced the amount of productivity growth and poverty reduction
that could result from the macroeconomic reforms.
During the 1990s, a rethinking of development models and the role
of aid began. This was facilitated by a combination of four developments. First, the end of the Cold War reduced the geopolitical pressures on aid agencies. Second, there was an increasing recognition of
the successes of India, China, and other developing countries that had
achieved macro balance and sustained growth while adopting their own
particular development models. Third, there was mounting evidence of
an apparent failure of orthodox adjustment models adopted by African
and other highly indebted countries, as evidenced by the lack of positive growth and poverty outcomes. Finally, there was a growing body of
analytic literature that highlighted the importance of the need for a more
comprehensive approach to development and wider understanding of
poverty, focusing on both human capital (education, health) and physical capital (infrastructure), as well as institutions and participation.25
The statistical evidence shows that large-scale financial aid can generally be used effectively for poverty reduction when reasonably good
policies are in place.26 In recent years, donors have increasingly acted
on these findings by tailoring support to local needs and circumstances.
Thus, the balance of support has moved toward providing large-scale
aid to those that can use it well and focusing on knowledge and capacitybuilding support in other countries. This has been reflected in greater
selectivity and coordination in lending, shifting resources toward governance and institutions, emphasizing ownership, and making room
for diverse responses to local needs. These new approaches and procedures have begun to pay off. However, it is clear that there is still much
to learn: for example, how can countries with very weak governance
effectively catalyze and support reforms and institution building?
Should we then use only policy and institutional quality as measures in determining aid flows? This would probably be too rash a conclusion. Research by Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) takes an
entirely different approach: instead of focusing on the different policy
and institutional characteristics of recipient countries, they focus on the
characteristics of different types of aid flows. Importantly, they only
consider what they term “short-impact” aid, which includes budget and
balance of payments support, infrastructure investments, and aid for
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productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. In contrast to previous studies, they find a strong impact of aid on growth (and thus on
poverty reduction, at least to some extent) regardless of institutions and
policies.27 In light of such evidence, it probably is too soon to call for
substantial reallocations of aid other than of those flows that reflect only
strategic, rather than humanitarian or economic, considerations.

MIGRATION
International migration involves the movement of people, on either
a temporary or permanent basis, among the countries of the world
economy. Throughout human history, these changes of residence have
helped to alleviate human suffering, enhance technological progress,
and promote cultural exchange. As of 2006, approximately 200 million
people, or 3 percent of the world’s population, lived outside their country of birth. Although this percentage is low by historical standards,
international migration has doubled since 1980. Migration continues to
be a key dimension of globalization and development, albeit one that
has complex determinants and outcomes.
A central component of the modern era of globalization that began
in the late nineteenth century was the Age of Mass Migration, described
by Hatton and Williamson (1998). Between 1850 and 1914, approximately 55 million Europeans migrated, most of them unskilled males
who settled in the United States. As Manning (2005) emphasizes, however, the Age of Mass Migration was not just European in nature, with
50 million Chinese and 30 million Indians also migrating (not all voluntarily), primarily to serve as unskilled laborers in British colonies in
Africa and the Pacific. Since then, much has changed, with migration
becoming an increasingly elusive escape route from poverty.
High-skilled migrants from developing countries are commonly
trained at substantial costs to the taxpayers of source countries through
public education systems. Their departure thus has profound effects in
the form of what is known as brain drain. Source countries can also
lose tax revenues that migrants would have generated. More importantly, many of the skills sent from less-developed to more-developed
countries are already scarce in source countries. In the case of medi-
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cal services, for which more-developed countries have a strong desire
and less-developed countries an urgent need, the brain drain can cost
lives. In Malawi, for example, HIV/AIDS has reduced the country’s life
expectancy to under 40 years. Despite this health crisis, the country has
lost approximately half its nursing staff to migration. Partly as a result,
the rate at which Malawian women die during pregnancy and childbirth
has approximately doubled.28
The emigration of skilled workers does not always create problems
for source countries. In some cases, emigration alerts outside investors to
a large or relatively underused skill base of the source country. The success of skilled Indian migrants in the United States, for instance, helped
to spur the large inﬂow of information and communication technologyrelated FDI to India seen during recent years. Many foreign information and communication technology companies, impressed by the talent
working for them outside India, sought equivalently skilled individuals within India as employees in FDI-related facilities. Thus, when the
conditions are right, skilled migrants are able to generate networks of
investment, trade, and technology transfer that increase the productivity
and demand for skills in the home country, while extending the global
technology frontier and lowering the cost of products used by billions
of people worldwide.
Another potentially compensating beneﬁt of the brain drain is that it
tends to increase the demand for skills in the source country by raising
the rate of return to education. Some researchers have suggested that,
even accounting for the emigration of skilled individuals, the increase
in demand for education generated by brain drain may actually increase
the number of skilled workers in the population. This is known as brain
gain. While brain gain outcomes are possible, they depend on very large
responses in the supply of education and training. They are not, therefore, a general outcome of high-skilled migration.
The most easily quantiﬁable beneﬁt of emigration to source countries is the ﬂow of money, or remittances, sent by migrant workers to
their home countries. Recent estimates suggest that the total remittance
ﬂow to developing countries now exceeds US$200 billion (see Figure
2.3, which does not quite capture the current value due to data lags in
the other series). In a number of countries, remittance inﬂows are larger
than inﬂows of foreign direct investment and can compose up to 10
percent of national incomes. As is evident in Figure 2.4, such ﬂows can
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Figure 2.4 Foreign Remittances, 2003
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make a significant difference for families living in poverty in source
countries, which is a common reason why communities allow and
sometimes even encourage their family members to seek work abroad
(see Adams and Page [2005]).
Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
liberalization of services trade has occurred in a number of sectors of
interest to developed countries such as finance and telecommunications. The WTO’s General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) recognizes the temporary movement of natural persons as a way to export
certain labor-intensive services such as housekeeping and construction.
Given the natural comparative advantage of developing countries in
such labor-intensive services, this channel could be of great importance
to their trade and development prospects. The WTO protocol on the
temporary movement of natural persons, however, is largely limited to
the exchange of corporate personnel and is not designed to enhance the
delivery of labor-intensive services. This urgently needs to be rectified.

IDEAs
Idea formation and reformation have been and continue to be integral to development processes and policies because, as emphasized by
Adelman (2001), development processes are significantly nonlinear and
nonunique. Consequently, ideas play a key role in organizing and making sense of development experience and have gone through a number
of paradigm shifts. Importantly, the environments to which development ideas respond are increasingly affected by the various processes
characterizing globalization. For this reason, the role of ideas in development processes cannot be clearly understood without reference to the
various other dimensions of increased global integration.
Ideas are both a powerful influence on development and a key
dimension of globalization. Relevant here are three areas of inquiry
related to ideas, development, and globalization: 1) the idea of development itself, along with the related issue of the idea of growth; 2) the
role of ideas in globalization processes; and 3) the question of ideas for
development, along with the related issues of development knowledge
management, intellectual property, and learning. We focus here on the
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last of these, ideas for development, since it has the most relevance to
this chapter.
Ideas are codified in the form of knowledge, and knowledge is
in many respects a public good. Once an idea has been codified, that
knowledge can often be used at low marginal cost, and its use by any
one person does not preclude its use by others. This characteristic of
knowledge is precisely the hallmark of a public good and suggests that
knowledge, like other public goods, will be underprovided by market
systems. The challenge, then, is the effective development and management of knowledge, recognizing its (global) public good nature.
Knowledge management, a difficult task for firms, is even more daunting for developing countries.
A first element of knowledge management for development is
increasing the voice of developing countries and their impoverished
citizens.29 This is an essential ingredient of inclusive globalization and
is especially important in global consultation and decision making
with direct consequences for the citizens of developing countries. It
is also important to enhance developing-country participation in global institutions in order to ensure their legitimacy. The governance of
the United Nations (at least at the Security Council level), the World
Bank, and the IMF reflects the balance of power 60 years ago.30 There
is widespread recognition of the need for enhancing the participation of
developing countries. Although some progress has been made in areas
related to program formation, the structural issues of voting rights and
board representation remain intractable. It remains, however, as stated
by Bhattacharya and Griffith-Jones (2004), “important to go beyond
consultation to full representation of developing countries in bodies that
deliberate and set international norms and action plans” (p. 205). The
principles of transparency, accountability, and good governance that
the global institutions advocate for developing countries should also
be embraced by these institutions themselves. The requisite reforms are
indeed daunting, but failure to undertake the challenge will undermine
any chances of an effective, multilateral system for managing globalization and development.
A second element of knowledge management for development is
broad access. In addition to investing in education and research, governments can facilitate the sharing of knowledge and make special efforts
to overcome the exclusion of poor communities from ideas. A particu-
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lar challenge is to make knowledge available in ways and languages
that can be understood by wide audiences, such as local development
practitioners who do not speak English. Timely and effective information flows on issues important to poor communities can both mitigate
risks and expand opportunities. Such efforts include providing market
prices to poor farmers via village mobile phones, broadcasting weather
information and disaster warnings on local radios, and highlighting the
risks of HIV/AIDS and the benefits of public health measures in community information campaigns. In these sorts of cases, knowledge helps
to empower poor people.
A third element of knowledge management for development is
increased technology transfer to developing countries. Article 66.2 of
the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) of the WTO commits developed countries to providing “incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer” to the least-developed
countries. This commitment needs to be implemented in practice and
applied to a wider set of countries. As outlined by Hoekman, Maskus,
and Saggi (2005), this can occur through a variety of measures, including
• incentives for corporations and nongovernmental organizations
to transfer mature patent rights or to provide technical assistance,
• public support for research into the specific technology needs of
developing countries,
• university training for students from the low-income countries in
science and technology,
• finance for participation of developing country representatives in
standard-setting bodies, and
• public purchase of patents on certain technologies for free use in
developing countries.
These and other steps can better ensure that knowledge in the form of
international technological development is more broadly spread in the
developing world.
Ideas codified into knowledge can become property when legal systems confer and enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs). The role of
IPRs in economic growth and development is controversial to say the
least. The standard argument is that the presence of strong intellectual
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property rights spurs innovation, which in turn leads to higher rates of
economic growth and poverty reduction. The basis of this argument is
that, if strong property rights provide good incentives for the production of things, they must also provide appropriate incentives for the
production of ideas. Boldrin and Levine (2002; 2004a,b) question this
assertion, arguing that intellectual property has come to mean not only
the right to own and sell ideas, but also the right to regulate their use,
which can create a socially inefficient monopoly. They agree that, for
efficiency reasons, ideas should be protected and available for sale, just
like any other commodity. They object, however, to the idea of an intellectual monopoly, arguing that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a
necessary consequence of, innovation, and that intellectual property is
not necessary for innovation and growth. In fact, it can hurt more than
help. Boldrin and Levine suggest that, although the producers of a new
product or service should have the right to benefit from its sale, they
should not be able to appropriate the right of others to learn from the
ideas embodied in that product. This argument has important implications for the role of ideas in globalization and development.
Since IPRs involve a key trade-off between potentially enhancing
innovation and supporting the monopolization of ideas, their application requires careful analysis of both benefits and costs of conferral in
order to ensure that IPR regimes promote both growth and more equitable development. How this can best be done is a question to which
answers greatly diverge. We consider here the issues of patents and traditional knowledge.
Patents are a central concern with regard to the role of IPRs in
development, especially in the areas of health, food, and agriculture. As
summarized by Leach (2004), for instance, “The essential trade-off in
choosing the patent life is that a longer patent life raises the rate at which
discoveries occur, but reduces the social benefits of each discovery”
(p. 175). The proponents of stronger patent protection in developing
countries argue that this protection will promote domestic innovation
as well as the flow of ideas through increased FDI and exports. There
is not complete agreement on this matter, however. For example, Kash
and Kingston (2001) argue that, in the case of complex technologies,
patent protection can actually inhibit innovation. To some extent, then,
the ability of increased patent protection to deliver access to knowledge
and innovation is uncertain.
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One suggested reform of current intellectual property arrangements
is to modify rules governing patents under the TRIPS agreement to
allow for patent ladders, in which the minimum extent of patent protection varies according to level of per capita income. Although designing
such a system is not straightforward, this is a way to avoid what, in
the case of environmental or labor standards, is disparagingly called a
“one-size-fits-all” approach to the standardization of global governance
systems.
One key area regarding patent protection is in the field of pharmaceuticals and the extension of patent rights to developing countries as
required by TRIPS. Although some argue that the extension of intellectual property rights may lead to more research on drugs to address
developing country needs, the evidence on the short experience since
this extension remains hotly contested (see, for example, Lanjouw and
Cockburn [2001]). There is evidence that the relatively low levels of
purchasing power in developing countries and the apparent lack of
commercial interest by the pharmaceutical companies remain important barriers.
Recent years have seen a number of highly significant efforts to
boost investment in research and its application in developing countries. These include the Measles Initiative, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, and the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Despite these
notable efforts, the recent example of the pressure placed on the governments of Brazil, India, and South Africa to honor U.S. patents on
HIV/AIDS drugs, thus raising the costs of these drugs to AIDS patients
in these countries, signals a remaining issue with regard to TRIPS and
public health.
There appear to be two approaches to dealing with the ongoing issue
of intellectual property and public health, namely the Lanjouw (2006)
proposal on regional declarations in patent applications and compulsory licensing under a permanent amendment to TRIPS. Lanjouw proposes that developed-country patent systems allow for patent enforcement only in one of two regions of the world: developed countries or
developing countries. In the case of what Lanjouw terms “global” diseases such as cancer or heart disease, developed-country pharmaceutical companies would choose to ensure patent protection in developed
countries where markets are significantly larger, allowing for less costly
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delivery of generic pharmaceuticals to the developing world. In the
case of “tropical” diseases such as malaria, pharmaceutical companies
would choose to ensure patent protection in the developing countries,
hopefully spurring innovation. Thus, the trade-off between innovation
and low cost would hopefully break out in the desired fashion across
global and tropical diseases.
This is an important proposal that has consequently received a good
deal of attention. It may not, however, adequately cover some important
diseases such as HIV/AIDS that have both global and tropical characteristics. There could indeed be cases where compulsory licensing
proves to be required in order to adequately address public health crises. A 2001 Doha ministerial declaration on TRIPS and public health
reconfirmed certain “flexibilities” available to protect public health,
including compulsory licensing. This declaration did not, however,
address the issue of the right of countries without domestic capacity
to import nonpatent pharmaceuticals.31 A 2003 WTO decision on this
issue allowed poor countries to import off-patent, generic drugs under
specified conditions, and directed the WTO TRIPS Council to prepare
an amendment based “where appropriate” on the decision (Matthews
2004, 2006). An agreement regarding this amendment was reached in
2005 and ratified in 2007. It remains, however, both for supporting legislation in WTO member countries to be fully enacted and for the provisions of the amendment to be tested in practice.32 It has become clear
that capacity building is necessary to support use of the system.
From the point of view of poverty alleviation, it is essential that
intellectual property protection be extended to traditional knowledge,
folklore, and culture, or what Finger (2004) calls “poor people’s knowledge.” It is not only essential that intellectual property regimes allow
developing countries to benefit from ideas developed in rich countries,
but also that their own indigenous ideas are suitably protected. The key
issue here, as expressed by Finger, is that of “enhancing the commercial
value of poor people’s knowledge in which there are no worries about
this use being culturally offensive to members of the community or
about this use undermining the traditional culture of the community”
(p. 3). Unless it extends to such types of knowledge, intellectual property protection will fail to positively help poor communities. Individual
country governments can help in this process by following India’s lead
and constructing Traditional Knowledge Digital Libraries containing
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formal inventories of all cultural property that its citizens might exploit
in the future (Sahai 2003). This is important to prevent future theft of
the country’s cultural patrimony.

CONCLusION
History and the recent experiences of many countries show that globalization can be a tool for reducing poverty. People living in poverty
are less likely to remain so in a country that is exchanging its goods,
services, and ideas with the rest of the world. Yet this positive impact
and reach remains uneven and there is a need for global coordination
and more effective global governance on issues such as armaments and
climate change. Several key areas for action are outlined below.33
First, global trade negotiations must produce more balanced outcomes if developing countries are to be able to successfully lift their
people out of poverty. Their ability to trade a wide range of goods and
services must be facilitated, and rich countries must stop impeding
development by the imposition of damaging tariff barriers and agricultural subsidies. For instance, there are twice as many tariff barriers
imposed upon goods produced by poor people as those produced by rich
countries. Nearly US$300 billion a year is spent on agricultural subsidies, which are almost worth more than the entire GDP of sub-Saharan
Africa.34 These subsidies deny developing countries export markets and
damage their capability to sell their produce in their own country. These
practices compound downward trends in commodity pricing, increase
instability, and undermine potential for diversification into higher valueadded manufactured products. Therefore, reforming the world trade
system is a vital step in ensuring that all the world’s inhabitants are able
to reap the benefits of globalization.
The second area for action is the increased provision of aid, assistance, and debt relief to countries that demonstrate a commitment to the
effective and equitable use of the additional resources. As mentioned
above, aid volumes have declined during recent decades to approximately 0.25 percent of high-income countries’ GDP, despite the fact
that donor countries are richer now than ever before and that aid has
never been more effectively used. Providing increased foreign assis-
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tance and implementing more rigorous schemes to monitor and evaluate the effective use of that aid are thus critical to ensuring that the
gains provided by globalization are not reversed by bad governance and
ineffective use of aid.
Foreign aid resource transfers are particularly important in the
poorest countries, and much higher levels of aid are urgently required
for investments in health, education, infrastructure, and for combating
HIV/AIDS and other diseases. These investments cannot be financed
by domestic savings alone, especially in countries that are currently
crushed under burdens of debt and escaping the ravages of past corruption and mismanagement.
A third area for action is enhancing the benefits of migration and
mitigating the negative effects. Remittances of over US$200 billion
have flowed directly to a large number of individuals and communities
(in contrast to much of aid). The transaction costs of such flows should
be lowered from the current 10–15 percent to around 1 percent, which
is closer to the cost of transfers between rich countries. On the other
hand, the loss of highly skilled individuals in the “brain drain” needs to
be mitigated, as it is a severe problem for many African and Caribbean
developing countries. Addressing the problems of the current migration
system and increasing its ability to provide real gains to poor people
will require a multilateral as well as bilateral commitment to effective
migration reform and management.
Finally, the international community should support global public
goods. Three examples are in the areas of eradicating the major infectious diseases, enhancing agricultural research, and combating climate
change. Most important, however, is the need for global peace and
stability to prevent war and civil conflict, which do much to generate
underdevelopment in many parts of the world.
Globalization has the potential to be a vehicle for shared growth,
prosperity, and reductions in poverty. However, this potential is not yet
being adequately realized, and the positive impacts of globalization
remain uneven. Global trade equity, more and better aid, effectively
benefiting from migration, and the support of global public goods are
key areas for action on the route to successfully achieving development
and harnessing the gains of globalization.
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Notes
1. For further, more detailed discussion, we refer the reader to Goldin and Reinert
(2007).
2. See, for example, James (1996, Chapter 1), O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), and
World Bank (2002).
3. See Bruton (1998) for a review of import substitution industrialization.
4. See Levinson (2006) on the role of container shipping in this process.
5. See Dollar and Kraay (2004), for example. An alternative view is given in
Rodríquez and Rodrik (2001). A thorough review of trade and poverty is provided
by Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004).
6. The fact that the trade-poverty alleviation linkage is not automatic has been
stressed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2004) in
the case of the least developed countries.
7. Watkins and Fowler (2002) note that “In itself, trade is not inherently opposed to
the interests of poor people. International trade can be a force for good, or for bad
. . . The outcomes are not pre-determined. They are shaped by the way in which
international trade relations are managed, and by national policies” (p. 28).
8. On the case of Bangladesh, for example, see Zohir (2001) and Watkins and Fowler
(2002).
9. For a review of the evidence on trade liberalization and productivity, see Winters,
McCulloch, and McKay (2004).
10. On the latter, see de Ferranti et al. (2002).
11. This point is emphasized by Reinert (2004).
12. Failure to do this weakens the claims of Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), for
example.
13. The World Bank (2001) notes that “If finance is fragile, banking is the most fragile
part” (p. 11).
14. For a critique of premature capital account liberalization, see Stiglitz (2000). As
the World Bank (2001) notes, “Poor sequencing of financial liberalization in a
poor country environment has undoubtedly contributed to bank insolvency” (p.
89). Hanson, Honohan, and Majnoni (2003) also note that “the riskiness of capital
account liberalization without fiscal adjustment . . . and without reasonably strong
financial regulation and supervision and a sound domestic financial system, is well
recognized” (p. 10).
15. The present chapter is in broad agreement with Singh (1999), who says that “The
experience of many Asian and Latin American countries with portfolio capital
flows . . . indicates that the African countries would benefit from using their efforts
and institutional resources to attract FDI rather than portfolio flows” (p. 356). It
does, however, distinguish between portfolio flows in the form of equity investment and those in the form of bond finance, with a preference for the former.
16. Caves (1996) notes that “Survey evidence indicates that MNEs do some adapting
(of technologies to labor-abundant conditions), but not a great deal, and it appears
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18.
19.
20.
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24.

25.
26.
27.

28.
29.

that the costs of adaptation commonly are high relative to the benefits expected by
individual companies” (p. 241).
Dunning (1993) notes that “With the exception of some European-based companies, the proportion of R&D activity by MNEs undertaken outside their home
countries is generally quite small and, in the case of Japanese firms, negligible” (p.
301).
For the role of clusters in natural resource–based development, see Ramos (1998).
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that it is the combination of FDI
and education that has a statistically significant impact on growth.
Dobson and Hufbauer (2001, Chapter 1) review this evidence. Singh (1999), to
some extent at least, contests this conclusion.
Mistakes made in these areas have proved to be too costly to the poor in the past
for countries to relax their vigilance. Prasad et al. (2003) conclude that “The relative importance of different sources of financing for domestic investment, as proxied by the following three variables, has been shown to be positively associated
with the incidence and the severity of currency and financial crises: the ratio of
bank borrowing or other debt relative to foreign direct investment; the shortness
of the term structure of external debt; and the share of external debt denominated
in foreign currencies” (p. 49).
As emphasized by Bhinda et al. (1999), variable deposit requirements are flexible
in three dimensions: 1) percentage, 2) minimum deposit period, and 3) application
to new versus existing credits. These flexibilities, as well as their market-friendly
nature, make variable deposit requirements an attractive policy option.
See, in particular, Goldin, Rogers, and Stern (2002). The overall debate on aid
effectiveness is reviewed in Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004).
See Owens and Hoddinott (1998). As Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004) note,
“This kind of assistance should have a negative simple correlation with growth,
as the disaster simultaneously causes both low growth and large aid flows. While
it is possible that aid might mitigate that fall in growth, any additional pathway of
causation from humanitarian aid to growth is extremely difficult to detect” (p. 2).
In the realm of foreign aid, some (but not all) of this new thinking was reflected in
World Bank (1998).
See Burnside and Dollar (2000). These results have been recently questioned by
Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004).
The authors note that “The result is robust over a wide variety of specifications . . .
It holds over various time periods, stands up whether we include or exclude influential observations, and remains robust when controlling for possible endogeneity
of several independent variables” (p. 40).
Approaches to deal with the difficult issue of brain drain of health professionals
are discussed in Martineau, Decker, and Bundred (2004).
This theme has been recently taken up by Sen (2006, Chapter 7), who states that
“The preeminent practical challenges today include the possibility of making use
of the remarkable benefits of economic connections, technological progress, and
political opportunity in a way that pays adequate attention to the interests of the
deprived and the underdog” (pp. 131–132).
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30. As Derviş (2005) notes, “Without greater legitimacy at the supranational level,
progress in solving global problems will be very difficult” (p. 3). Derviş makes
very specific proposals for changing the governance structures of these institutions
that deserve careful consideration.
31. This issue arises because Article 31(f) of TRIPS limits the use of pharmaceuticals produced under compulsory licenses to the domestic markets of producing
countries.
32. Matthews (2006) notes that “It is perhaps surprising that no developing country
has yet used the new mechanism to allow the importation of generic medicines
following the issuance of a compulsory license in a developed country prior to
patent expiry” (p. 130).
33. Further, detailed policy proposals are made in Goldin and Reinert (2007).
34. To simplify, these are roughly half in the form of producer support payments and
half in the form of market price support, the latter effected through border measures. See Tokarick (2008).
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International Migration,
Remittances, and
Economic Development
Susan Pozo
Western Michigan University

Ask almost anyone today whether we live in a more globalized
economy and you will likely hear, “Of course we do, the world is
‘smaller’ today than a century ago.” While I agree that countries interact much more than in the past, many do not appreciate the history of
that process, tending to characterize the increased globalization through
trade, finance, and migration as novel. I begin this chapter by discussing
economic history for a number of countries, over different time periods,
and concerning different facets of globalization.
My goal is to convey three basic points concerning the world economy. The first is that globalization—sometimes referred to as economic
integration—is not so new. If we look more carefully at the evidence
surrounding us we find that the intermingling of people located in different corners of the globe along with their economic interactions is not
unique to the present period. People and goods have crisscrossed the
globe for centuries, leaving behind changes in commerce, technology,
culture, and know-how.
The second point is that while the globalization process has been
taking place for some time, it does in several respects manifest itself
differently today. Facets of globalization and economic integration that
we observe today do differ in important ways from what we observed
in the past. These differences are due in part to dramatic technological
advances that have taken place with respect to transportation and communication. These advances have drastically reduced prices and have
expanded in many dimensions the modes that can be availed of to transport people, goods, and information.
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The third point is with respect to globalization’s impact on economic development. While it is often claimed that globalization disadvantages the less fortunate, causing labor dislocations and increasing
income disparities around the globe, it is also the case that globalization
through migration can be a powerful force with the potential to significantly improve the lot for out-migration communities in many areas of
the globe (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). It is this facet of globalization—the spread of international migration—upon which this chapter
ultimately focuses.

GLOBALIzATION Is NOT sO NEW
Countries interact with each other in a number of ways—through
trade in goods and services, by borrowing and lending financial assets,
and by migration. While this chapter focuses on international migration
as it relates to globalization and economic development, it begins with
a detour into more familiar and established territory for most readers. I
first present data on globalization as measured by the share of international trade in GDP—an openness index. This particular index or one
of its close variants is what researchers usually cite when making the
case that the world is much more integrated today, that economies today
interact substantially more with each other relative to the past.
The notion that globalization is of recent vintage probably originates from the analysis of an openness index relative to its value 50 or
60 years ago. For example, take the case of the United States. Figure 3.1
shows the ratio of U.S. international trade flows (U.S. exports plus U.S.
imports) to U.S. national income (GDP) since 1945. The graph clearly
suggests that international trade (as a share of GDP) was relatively level
to 1970 and then consistently grew. Diagrams such as the one plotted in
Figure 3.1 are the basis of the general perception that the U.S. economy
was fairly closed economically with respect to the rest of the world until
fairly recently.
By contrast, an examination of Figure 3.2, where this same series is
plotted from 1870 to the present, provides us with an entirely different
impression. What emerges from this broader timeline of U.S. economic
history is that today’s relatively high fraction of trade in U.S. GDP is
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Figure 3.1 Trade as a share of GDP in the united states, 1945–2001
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neither unique nor new. In 1916 merchandise trade as a share of GDP
was 19.7 percent, exceeding the 18.9 percent share observed in 2001.
The plot suggests that the argument that globalization is new is generally derived from an examination of data since World War II. But if
we instead peer further back, a totally different picture emerges. We
observe relatively low trade flows during and surrounding the interwar
period (World War I through World War II). The interwar period and
period immediately surrounding it with its relatively low share of trade
in GDP appear as an exception to the rule. Both before and after that
period, international trade played larger roles in the U.S. economy.
It is understandable that researchers tend to analyze economic flows
since World War II, generally disregarding or shying away from economic data series prior to the interwar period. Since World War II, governments and international organizations have become more interested
in collecting economic data in a systematic and consistent manner.1
International organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank,
the OECD, and the International Monetary Fund have expended considerable effort and resources to facilitate and coordinate the collection
of data so that economic information is readily available and compa-
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Figure 3.2 Trade as a share of GDP, united states
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rable across countries and over time.2 Consequently, series since World
War II have become more reliable, tempting researchers to restrict their
research to the analysis of recent data, or at a minimum, the post–World
War II period. There are drawbacks, however, to limiting our analysis
to more recent data. We fail to appreciate important changes and turning
points in the time series of flows, compromising our understanding of
economic activity both in the short and long run.
Yet another picture emerges of globalization through trade if we
examine a century of data for Argentina. Figure 3.3 displays an index
of openness obtained by expressing the sum of Argentina’s exports and
imports as a share of GDP. While total merchandise trade was equal
to about half of Argentina’s GDP at the turn of the last century (i.e., in
1900), Argentina’s trade accounted for less than one-fifth of GDP in
2000. Using simple indexes of openness, Argentina appears less globalized today relative to yesterday. In the Southern Cone, globalization
through international trade has faltered rather than grown.
Misconceptions regarding the globalization of economies through
migration also arise if we similarly limit ourselves to analyzing recent
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Figure 3.3 Trade as a share of GDP, Argentina
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data on migration. U.S. data on the percentage of the U.S. population
that is foreign born is presented in Figure 3.4. These data are from the
U.S. decennial census. If we restrict the analysis to data from the 1970s
to the present we observe that the U.S. population has become increasingly foreign born, from about 5 percent to 12 percent of the U.S. population. However, a longer-run view reveals that during the late 1800s
and early 1900s, an even greater percentage of the U.S. population was
foreign born, hovering at 15 percent.
Economic history provides us with many examples of globalization from earlier time periods that parallel the process we see occurring
today. For example, Molina (2008) suggests that legal changes with
respect to China, both in 1882 and in 2001, in turn impacted MexicanU.S. migratory flows in substantial ways. The Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882, which effectively shut down Chinese immigration to the United
States, was followed by a substantial rise in Mexican immigrants to the
United States, presumably due to labor shortages caused by the exclusion of Chinese labor. One hundred twenty years later, the acceptance
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Figure 3.4 Percentage of u.s. Population That Is Foreign Born
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of China into the World Trade Organization seems to have had a similar impact, that of stimulating Mexican-U.S. immigration. With China
a formal member of the world trading system, the relative competitiveness of Mexican industry seems to have been reduced, causing an
excess supply of Mexican labor. The excess supply seems to have found
an outlet in the U.S. labor market, which proved relatively eager to
absorb that Mexican labor. Hence both in 1882 and in 2001, changes in
immigration statutes with respect to Chinese nationals have impacted
Mexico-U.S. economic flows. The interactions across countries that we
observe today and are attributed to “globalization” are similarly found
in yesterday’s world.
Another example of economic integration both in the past and today
is with respect to workers’ remittances. As of late, the popular press has
consistently reported on the large flows of immigrants’ earnings that are
sent to their home communities (DeParle 2007, 2008). The main point
in these articles is that these flows of money have not been adequately
recognized in the past, in part because they were relatively small and
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have only recently been of much significance. But the notion that remittances were not important or significant in earlier time periods is not
corroborated by the historical data I have collected on Italian remittances. Figure 3.5 shows the ratio of remittances sent by Italian emigrants relative to Italian GNP in order to measure the relative size of
the flows over time.3 The figure shows averages of this ratio for each
decade from the 1860s through the 1930s. Around the turn of the century, cross-border money flows from Italian-origin immigrants to their
families remaining in Italy accounted for about 4 or 5 percent of Italian
national income. The remarkable aspect of this value is that remittances
to Mexico are currently considered to be at their highest, but not even
reaching 3 percent of Mexico’s national income.4 Hence, in relation
to national income, remittances were more important to Italy in 1900
than they are to Mexico today, even though the levels of remittances to
Mexico now are considered to be extraordinarily large and newsworthy.
Figure 3.5 Remittance Receipts as a Percentage of GNP: Italy 1860–1930
5.0
4.5

Sum of share remittances

4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1860

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930

SOURCE: Author’s calculations from information contained in Mitchell (1998) and
Cinel (1991).

44 Pozo

GLOBALIzATION MANIFEsTs ITsELF DIFFERENTLy
TODAy RELATIVE TO yEsTERDAy
There is considerable evidence that the interchange of goods, the
migrations of people, and the international flows of financial assets
have a long economic history. The case can be made, however, that
today’s interactions differ in important respects from the interactions of
economies yesterday. Technological advances have changed the nature
of international trade and the context in which immigration, emigration, and international money flows take place. This section discusses
how two economic sectors—transportation and communication—have
affected the globalization process.
While commentaries today tend to suggest that the observed
increased trade globalization is a result of changes in the willingness of
countries to open up to foreign markets (such as through the formation
of global, regional, and bilateral trade liberalization pacts), economic
historians are placing more weight on technological change as the main
driving force. It has become substantially cheaper to transport goods,
people, and ideas today than it was a century ago, and these reductions in costs are generally attributed to technological advances. Figure
3.6 displays Mohammed and Williamson’s (2004) calculations of a real
global tramp shipping price index, showing that shipping rates in 1994
were about one-third of 1870 rates in real terms. These reduced transportation costs have certainly played a role in allowing trading patterns
to become more complex, to involve more nations, and to change direction at a moment’s notice.
While declining transportation costs have played an important role
in stimulating trade, they also are responsible for inducing increased
flows of people, ideas, and financial assets. Lower transportation costs,
of course, make migration more likely due to the easing of financial burdens associated with moving from one country to another, but there are
other channels by which declining transportation costs promote migration. Lower transportation costs ease the pain and risks that accompany
migration, inducing more migration to take place. If the migrant discovers that work is not as plentiful or lucrative in the destination area,
lower fares will permit the return of the migrant to her point of origin or
to another destination. The reversibility of migration is likely to induce
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Figure 3.6 Real Global Transportation Cost Index: 1870–1994
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a greater volume of flows and a more diverse set of migrants. Temporary immigrants are likely to be more plentiful, and migrants can afford
to travel farther away. Cheaper fares also promote tourism and the ability to learn about other unfamiliar regions of the world, facilitating subsequent migration. But most importantly for our focus, reduced transportation costs encourage continued interactions of migrants with their
home communities, which is important for economic development—a
point I argue in the next section.
While reductions in transportation costs have significantly facilitated the transport of goods and people, reductions in communication
costs have been even more substantial and have likely resulted in even
greater changes in global economic relations. Table 3.1 displays telephone rates for New York to London and New York to Buenos Aires
(for a three-minute call) from the inception of telephone service in
that market to 1981. The first two columns report nominal telephone
rates, while the third and fourth columns express those same rates in
real terms.5 The inflation-indexed series indicates that transatlantic calls
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were 130 times more expensive in 1927 relative to calls made in 1981.
While the 1927 rate appears to be fantastically high, one must recall
the capital stock that went into providing one telephone conversation at
that time. For example, when telephone service was initiated from New
York to San Francisco in 1915, the system could accommodate only one
conversation at a time (Field 2006).
The ease with which migrants can now keep in touch with individuals living far away has substantially changed the relations that migrants
have with the family members that did not accompany them. Migrants’
ties with the home community are stronger and longer-lasting, with better information flows in both directions. Migrants can remain abreast
of the continuing or the sporadic needs of the family back home. News
of sickness, marriages, or business opportunities can now be quickly
and relatively cheaply communicated. Money transfers, whether from
migrant to family or family to migrant, are easily tracked and made
more secure by the ability of the sender to pair the money transfer with
a telephone call to the recipient.6 And regardless of the migrant’s or the
family’s ability to read and write, communication is easy and readily
accessible.
In their study of international trade, Freund and Weinhold (2004)
find that the Internet has increased the rate of growth of exports. It
is logical to also presume that the Internet has changed the nature of
human migration. It has vastly increased the ability of individuals, with
or without migration networks, to secure pertinent information prior to
migration. By obtaining such information, migrants increase the odds
of having a successful migration. The Internet has also vastly reduced
the costs of keeping in contact with family and friends left behind. This
is likely to ease the pain of separation, further inducing migratory flows.
In sum, lower transportation costs and communications costs due to
technological advances have had significant impacts on the environment
in which international migration takes place. Lower transportation costs
allow, of course, for a greater volume of overall migration, but also for
more return migration. More temporary or short-term migration is also
encouraged since migrants require smaller rewards in order to recover
the costs of moving from one region of the world to another. Advances
in communications technology keep migrants informed of home events,
of the everyday or acute needs of the family, strengthening family and
community migration networks, even among the illiterate.
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Table 3.1 Nominal and Real Telephone Rates from the Beginning of
Telephone service to 1981
Nominal prices for a
Real prices for a 3-minute
3-minute call from NY to:
call from NY to:
Year
London
Buenos Aires
London
Buenos Aires
1927
75.0
—
793.1
—
1928
45.0
—
484.2
—
1929
45.0
—
484.2
—
1930
30.0
36.0
330.5
396.6
1931
30.0
30.0
363.1
363.1
1932
30.0
30.0
402.9
402.9
1934
30.0
30.0
411.9
411.9
1936
21.0
21.0
277.9
277.9
1937
21.0
21.0
268.3
268.3
1939
21.0
15.0
277.9
198.5
1940
21.0
15.0
276.0
197.1
1941
21.0
15.0
262.8
187.7
1944
21.0
12.0
219.5
125.4
1945
12.0
12.0
122.6
122.6
1946
12.0
12.0
113.2
113.2
1952
12.0
12.0
83.3
83.3
1959
12.0
12.0
75.8
75.8
1960
12.0
12.0
74.5
74.5
1965
12.0
12.0
70.0
70.0
1967
12.0
12.0
66.1
66.1
1968
12.0
12.0
63.4
63.4
1970
9.6
12.0
45.5
56.9
1972
9.6
12.0
42.2
52.8
1973
9.6
12.0
39.7
49.7
1974
3.6
8.0
13.4
29.8
1975
3.6
8.0
12.3
27.3
1976
3.6
8.0
11.6
25.8
1977
3.6
8.0
10.9
24.2
1978
4.5
8.0
12.6
22.5
1980
4.8
7.0
10.7
15.7
1981
3.0
4.5
6.0
9.1
NOTE: Real prices are expressed in 2003 dollars. See note 5 for details.
SOURCE: Nominal telephone rates are from Carter et al. (2006). Real telephone rates
are computed by the author applying a consumer price index from the same source.
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GLOBALIzATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This section discusses a sampling of the channels by which migration and its by-products impact economic development. These channels
have been fortified by the dramatic decreases in transportation costs
that we have observed and by the improvements in communications
technologies that continue to this date. These have greatly facilitated
migration and the continued interactions between migrants living afar
and the family back home. I begin with a discussion of migration’s
impact on economic growth in origin communities and follow with how
emigrants’ by-products affect growth and development back home.
Cheaper transportation and better communications across countries
help to lower barriers to migration and therefore have the potential to
greatly expand the level of temporary international migration that takes
place. Take, for example, the nearly threefold increase in foreign student
enrollments in the United States (from 1.4 percent of all U.S. students
for the 1954–1955 academic year to 3.9 percent of U.S. higher education enrollment during the 2006–2007 academic year [Institute of International Education 2006]). Undoubtedly, lower transportation costs
and the ease with which parents and students can communicate despite
great distances has aided in that growth. Reductions in nonpecuniary
and monetary costs must improve the cost-benefit ratio, encouraging
foreign study, the subsequent return home, and the eventual transmission, to poor countries, of technical and scientific expertise by students
originating from those countries.
The contribution toward economic development that students can
make when they study abroad is not limited to the human capital that
they repatriate home at the conclusion of their sojourn at universities
abroad. Networks are created between these students and their professors, between international and domestic students, and between international students from one country and international students from other
countries. In today’s world, these networks are likely to prove stronger
and longer lasting given the variety of ways by which we cheaply communicate to most areas of the world. Foreign study by students, therefore, results in the flow of knowledge and expertise to poor countries.
This continued flow is especially possible today given the advent of
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nearly costless forms of communication such as e-mail and Voice over
Internet Protocol.
At this juncture it is appropriate to ask whether poor countries also
pay a price for the facilitated flow of students across countries. While it
may be easier for students to flow from poor countries to rich countries
to acquire education, the flow also can go in the other direction. Individuals who have already received training or education in poor countries
emigrate to richer countries with hopes of higher wages and expanded
opportunities. This results in “brain drain,” weakening the prospects
for development in poorer regions of the world as these nations lose
scarce human capital. This concern is of paramount importance given
that, as of late, developed countries have modified their immigration
policies to favor skilled immigration over family reunification immigration, stimulating the exodus of educated individuals from all areas
of the globe. Given the expected income differentials to migration, the
highly educated from poorer regions of the world are particularly motivated. The origin communities are not only deprived of talented individuals, they are also put into the position of subsidizing human capital
acquisition that ultimately benefits rich nations, since in many cases the
education is acquired at the developing country’s expense. For example, one estimate for 2004 suggests that 26 percent of Somali-trained
physicians practice abroad. During that same year there were 4 physicians per 100,000 persons in Somalia, a far cry from the U.S. ratio of
300 physicians per 100,000 population (Docquier and Bhargava 2006).
The possibility that easier emigration can strip poor countries of scarce
resources that are important for development is a real concern.
On the flip side of the brain drain debate is the argument that the
emigration of the highly educated leads to “brain gain.” If there is the
possibility of out-migration of the more highly educated (because of
the possibility of accruing higher returns for one’s talents and expertise
abroad), there will be greater competition for the “emigration slots,”
leading to increases in overall investments in human capital accumulation as individuals attempt to distinguish themselves from others
vying for visas. Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997) argue that
the resulting brain gain exceeds the brain loss. Others, including Schiff
(2006), disagree that the gains are greater than the losses and see the
emigration of the highly skilled as generally disadvantaging the laborexporting nations.
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Individuals who emigrate on a temporary basis can also bring home
expertise acquired in ways other than through formal education. For
example, McCormick and Wahba (2001) find that temporary emigrants
who have worked abroad in previously unfamiliar labor markets return
home not only with capital to begin new businesses, but also with entrepreneurial abilities from that experience. By observing other forms of
“doing business” and other uses of technology, emigrants learn how to
become more flexible and to take advantage of opportunities that may
await them in the communities to which they return.
Foreign direct investment has also vastly expanded in today’s world,
and it is often credited with promoting economic development in capitalpoor countries. But the acquisition of physical capital isn’t the only
channel by which growth is stimulated when FDI takes place. Top-level
managers, scientists, and engineers from the home office often accompany FDI. In the process of putting in place the physical capital—
manufacturing the goods for sale and delivering the firm’s services—
the home office employees tend to transfer technology and know-how
from countries that tend to be well-endowed with these resources to
more poorly endowed areas.
Social remittances, “a local-level, migration-driven form of cultural diffusion,” is yet another avenue by which migration may influence economic development (Levitt 1998). Return migrants resettling
back home share ideas, technology, expectations, and familiarity with
foreign institutions and foreign markets, which in turn can facilitate
economic development. Those who visit home temporarily and communicate often with their families may also be helping to lift their home
countries from poverty.7
Emigration has also been found to stimulate trade in goods and
services between pairs of labor exporting and labor importing nations
(Mundra 2005). This type of international trade is sometimes referred to
as “nostalgic trade.” Mexican immigrants in the United States yearning
for traditional foods and beverages demand these in the U.S. marketplace, stimulating merchandise trade and promoting agricultural production back home. After a while, these products can become known
and favored by the host country population and stimulate that trade on a
broader basis, as in the case of the popularity of Mexican cuisine in the
United States today.
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An extremely important by-product of migration is the flow of
money that immigrants send home. These are referred to as workers’
remittances and have gained the interest of bankers, academicians, and
government policymakers. On a number of levels these flows have been
credited with stimulating economic development.
Earlier we established that temporary migration is likely to be stimulated by the dramatic decreases that have taken place with respect to
transportation costs. Likewise, by easing the continuation of contacts
among families separated by long distances, reductions in communications costs make migration for the purpose of earning money abroad
much more palatable. In short, increases in temporary migration to
earn wages in a geographically distant land increase the flow of remittances across borders. In addition, given that money transfers today
are less costly and more secure, it is more likely that resources flow
back home on a periodic basis. The receipt of remittances can contribute toward economic development by compensating for liquidity constraints often encountered in poorer regions of the world. Remittances
have been linked to investments in existing businesses in the Dominican Republic as measured by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006),
while Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find that the existence of migration networks (which they presume signals greater access to remittance
receipts) appears to increase profits and capital investment in Mexican
microenterprises located in urban areas. Remittances have also been
linked to increases in educational investments in a number of studies,
including studies using Haitian, Dominican, and El Salvadorian data.
(See Amuedo-Dorantes, Georges, and Pozo [forthcoming]; AmuedoDorantes and Pozo [2009]; and Edwards and Ureta [2003], respectively.)
Remittances have also been credited with reducing the incidence
of “sudden stops” of capital inflows (Bugamelli and Paterno 2005).
Countries that experience large inflows of remittances are thought to
be less vulnerable to economic recessions and global crises given the
belief that substantial levels of these flows are motivated by altruism.
Altruistic inflows will tend to be countercyclical, reducing the damage
that foreign investors may impart when they become concerned with
a poorly performing economy and withdraw resources. The countercyclical nature of the flows from the emigrants who remit are likely to
be stronger if they are better informed about the immediate situation and
the economic needs of their families back home. If the emigrants know
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that times are bad for their families, they will remit more. And as they
learn that economic recovery is on the way, they are likely to remit less.
It is logical to assume that cheaper and better communications have
led to improvements in the timing of altruistic remittance inflows so
that they can better serve in this countercyclical manner. Consequently,
it is plausible that remittances reduce the threat of currency crises.
Foreign investors are less likely to behave in ways that destabilize the
currency in the face of this vast force of remitters who will naturally
provide resources to the family back home as unfavorable shocks hit
the economy.
Remittances have also been found to encourage the development of
infrastructures that facilitate development. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009)
purport to find that the channelling of substantial sums of money by
emigrants to their families in Mexico has provided incentives for financial intermediaries to locate in the migrant sending areas. Financial
intermediaries are in effect taking advantage of increased demand for
services that result from the money inflows that emigrants send home.
This is especially important in the case of Mexico, given that there has
traditionally been relatively more out-migration in Mexico’s rural and
less-developed areas of the country—the same areas that traditionally
have been ignored by the banking system.

DIsCussION AND CONCLusIONs
Globalization has been progressing for some time, rising and falling, but it is certainly not unique to our times. The perception that
growth in these economic interactions is of only recent vintage might
originate from limiting ourselves to examining data from the latter half
of the twentieth century, where these patterns are not obvious, driving us to conclude that globalization is a product of the past 50 or so
years. In contrast, once we examine data from earlier time periods, we
find that globalization through trade, finance, and migration has a much
longer history.
While the globalization process was certainly born before the past
half century, there appear to be differences in the interactions of countries today relative to yesterday that are worth dwelling on. This chapter
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focuses on international migration in particular, pointing to the context
in which migration took place in the past relative to today. Technological
advances have translated into widespread reductions in transportation
and international communications costs. Migrants, potential migrants,
and the families living back home all have access to much better information, reducing the risks involved with migration and increasing the
flow of information between families living in different parts of the
world. This has the potential to greatly improve the lives of migrants,
their families, and the communities from which migrants originate.
Lower transportation and communications costs today keep emigrants abreast of events back home. Emigrants and the families from
which they originate can easily and cheaply maintain ties with one
another. Migrants know what is happening back home and what the
needs of the family may be on a day-to-day basis. The families that
remain in the home community have clearer perceptions of the lives
and activities of their family abroad. In earlier time periods, these communications were less accessible and likely caused greater numbers of
migrants to lose touch with their families back home, leading to lower
flows of resources back home and fewer instances of the return of information that could be used to stimulate economic development.
It is interesting that there have been substantial calls for globalization in some dimensions and calls for restrictions in others. While arguments are made in favor of unimpeded flows of capital and of goods
across countries, the same cannot be said about people flows. Economists often lobby for the free flow of capital from areas where capital is
abundant and earning lower returns to areas where capital is scarce and
earning higher returns, but we do not as often and as vigorously argue
that labor should move from areas where its return is lower to areas
where its return is higher. While we tend to claim that international
trade in goods and services is not a zero-sum game, but rather benefits
both importing and exporting nations in the aggregate, we do not as
consistently attribute likewise to the migrations of people.
Despite the impediments to migration that we tend to observe,
technological changes that have swept the transportation and communications sectors are likely to continue, propelling growth in migratory
flows and their by-products. It is up to us to make the most of the potential gains from the movement of resources to areas where they reap the
greatest gain, helping to free communities from poverty.
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Notes
1. For a discussion of the comparability of pre- and postwar data for the United
States, see Romer (1986).
2. For example, see Lemaitre (2005) for a discussion of the harmonization of migration statistics across countries and Alexander, Cady, and Gonzalez-Garcia (2008)
for discussion of the IMF’s extensive program on data standards, harmonization,
and dissemination.
3. I obtained nominal inflows of remittances to Italy from Cinel’s (1991) historical
account of Italian emigration, its impacts and by-products over the 1860 through
1930 period. Cinel does not provide remittance amounts for each year. Data on
Italian GNP were obtained from Mitchell (1998). I computed a remittance to GNP
value for each decade using the data that were available within each decade.
4. The Mexican Central Bank reports that remittances to Mexico were US$23,969.5
million in 2007 while its GDP stood at US$893,364 million. Remittances therefore accounted for only 2.68 percent of Mexico’s national income.
5. Nominal telephone rates (for a three-minute call) are from Historical Statistics of
the United States, series Dg60 and Dg63. Real telephone rates are computed by
the author applying consumer price index series Cc1 from the same source. Given
the base of the series, the rates are therefore expressed in 2003 dollars.
6. In some markets, Western Union’s money transfer fee includes a three-minute
telephone call from the sender of money to the money recipient. The call can be
used, for example, to advise the recipient of the transfer, the amount being transferred, and how to retrieve it.
7. Social remittance can also transfer undesirable habits and culture that can have
detrimental impacts on growth and development, as in the case of the rise of
gang violence thought to be imported to Central America from Los Angeles. See
Archibold (2007).
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Globalization and
Inequality among Nations
Joseph P. Joyce
Wellesley College

In 1870, at the beginning of the first modern era of globalization,
the world’s average per capita GDP was $873 (see Table 4.1).1 Average
income in the richest nations—the United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand—was $2,419, while income in the poorest—the African
nations—was $500, a spread of 5:1. By 1950, at the start of the second
era of globalization, income had risen to $9,268 in the same upperincome group, but only $890 in the African nations, and the spread had
risen to 13:1. By 2003, the corresponding income levels were $28,039
and $1,549, and the spread between the top and the bottom of the international distribution of income stood at 18:1.
These aggregate figures masked even greater disparities among
countries. In 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country
with a population of approximately 57 million people, had a GDP per
capita of $649. That same year, France, with a population of 60 million,
recorded per capita income of $28,877.2 The ratio of the income of the
average French citizen to a citizen of the African country was over 40:1.
The disparity in global income has become the focus of much scrutiny, inquiry, and debate. The questions that have arisen include: What
are the causes of these disparities? Is inequality among nations a consequence of globalization? How should the upper-income countries
respond?
Among those who have sought to answer these questions have been
a number of noted philosophers, including Rawls (1999), Pogge (2002,
2005), Risse (2005a,b,c) and Nussbaum (2006). Rawls, for example,
in The Law of Peoples (1999), writes: “ . . . the causes of the wealth
of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in
the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic
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Table 4.1 Per Capita GDP (1990 international dollars)
1870
Western Europe
1,960
U.S., Canada, Australia, NZ 2,419
Asia
556
Latin America
676
Eastern Europe & USSR
941
Africa
500
World
873
Spread

4.8

1913
3,457
5,233
696
1,494
1,558
637
1,526

1950
4,578
9,268
717
2,503
2,602
890
2,113

1973
11,417
16,179
1,718
4,513
5,731
1,410
4,091

2003
19,912
28,039
4,434
5,786
5,705
1,549
6,516

8.2

13.0

11.5

18.1

SOURCE: Maddison (2007).

structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their
political virtues” (p. 108).
The “burdened societies” lack the ability to function at a level of
economic activity which allows their citizens to secure the minimum
levels of subsistence, shelter, health care, etc. Rawls (1999) contends
that the “well-ordered” societies have a duty to assist these burdened
nations. However, the duty is not a distributive one; rather, the goal of
assistance is to help these nations manage their own affairs.
Nussbaum (2006) criticizes Rawls for his assumption that states have
equal standing in the global economy. She writes that to “ . . . assume
a rough equality between parties is to assume something so grossly
false of the world as to make the resulting theory unable to address the
world’s most urgent problems . . .” (p. 235). She states that we need to
“ . . . acknowledge the fact that the international economic system, and
the activities of multinational corporations, creates severe, disproportionate burdens for poorer nations, which cannot solve their problems
by wise internal policies alone” (p. 240).
Economic analysis cannot evaluate the philosophical merits of these
different responses, but it can shed some light on the reasons for the disparity across nations in income levels and the role of globalization in
their propagation. A better understanding of the reasons for economic
inequality can yield insights into the reasons why some nations prosper
over time but others do not, and what could be done about this disparity.

Globalization and Inequality among Nations 59

This chapter reviews several studies that have sought to clarify these
issues.
The next section of this chapter offers a survey of the different
explanations that have been offered to explain the disparity in global
income and the results of empirical analyses that have sought to distinguish among them. The third section summarizes the research on the
development of institutions, and the fourth section addresses the issue
of how globalization affects the poor. The last section offers some suggestions for how globalization can be managed to provide more opportunities for the poorest nations.

sOuRCEs OF INEquALITy
Inequality has long been a characteristic of the world economy. The
differences in the levels of income per capita reflect variations in the
growth of income in different regions, and these rates have also varied
over time (see Table 4.2). The growth of per capita GDP in Western
Europe, for example, rose to 1.33 percent during the first era of globalization, 1870–1913, and then fell to 0.76 percent during the time of the
two world wars and the intervening period. But it rose fivefold to 4.05
percent when globalization regained its momentum after 1950, before
falling to 1.87 percent after 1973. Growth per capita in Asia rose from
Table 4.2 Growth Rates of Per Capita GDP (%)
1820–1870 1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–1973 1973–2003
Western Europe
0.98
1.33
0.76
4.05
1.87
U.S., Canada,
1.41
1.81
1.56
2.45
1.85
Australia, NZ
Asia
−0.09
0.52
0.08
3.87
3.21
Latin America
−0.03
1.86
1.40
2.60
0.83
Eastern Europe
0.63
1.18
1.40
3.49
−0.02
& USSR
Africa
0.35
0.57
0.91
2.02
0.32
World
0.54
1.30
0.88
2.91
1.56
SOURCE: Maddison (2007).
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0.08 percent during the wartime period to 3.87 percent from 1950 to
1973 and 3.21 percent in the more recent era. Between 1950 and 2003,
Asia’s share of world GDP more than doubled, from 18.6 percent to
40.5 percent (see Table 4.3).
The sources of economic growth have become the subject of much
theoretical and empirical analysis in recent decades.3 Economists have
sought to look beyond the short-term fluctuations of the business cycle
to identify the determinants of a country’s productive capacity. Barro
(1997), in a summary of the work that he and others have done on this
topic, includes the initial level of per capita income, school enrollment
rates, and changes in the terms of trade among the determinants of the
growth of real per capita income. Theoretical studies have focused on
the role of technological innovation in sustaining growth over time. The
role of the financial sector in fostering development has also been the
subject of much analysis (see, for example, Levine [1997]).
More recently, economists have attempted to uncover the “deeper”
determinants of economic growth that exercise their influence over long
periods of time (see Table 4.4). The following factors have been identified as possibly fundamental:
• Geography (Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup 2000; Sachs 2001).
Many of the poorest countries are located near the equator.
Countries in the tropic regions generally possess less fertile soil,
unstable water supplies, and a larger incidence of diseases and
other adverse conditions which impede their development. In adTable 4.3 shares of World GDP (%)
1870
1913
Western Europe
33.1
33.0
U.S., Canada,
10.0
21.3
Australia, NZ
Asia
38.3
24.9
Latin America
2.5
4.4
Eastern Europe
12.0
13.4
& USSR
Africa
4.1
2.9
SOURCE: Maddison (2007).

1950
26.2
30.6

1973
25.6
25.3

2003
19.2
23.7

18.6
7.8
13.1

24.2
8.7
12.8

40.5
7.7
5.7

3.8

3.4

3.2
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dition, those countries that are landlocked face higher transportation costs and less access to foreign goods and ideas.
• Economic openness (Frankel and Romer 1999; Sachs and Warner 1995). Economies that are integrated with the world economy are open to technological advances, have the opportunity
to specialize in the production of goods, and can take advantage of economies of scale. Many of the fastest-growing East
Asian economies have used international trade to accelerate their
growth.
• Institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995; North 1990). These are the
rules and practices, both formal and informal, that govern behavior. The institutions that promote property rights and an effective legal system encourage innovation by their inhabitants. The
quality of governance provides an assurance of stability.
Empirical researchers have sought to distinguish the relative importance of these factors in the determination and variation of income over
time. This task is complicated by their interrelationships: geography,
for example, can affect a country’s integration with the global economy
and the evolution of its institutions. There can also be feedback between
economic openness and the development of institutions. In order to isolate the effect of the different proposed determinants, economists look
for instrumental variables that are exogenously correlated with economic integration or institutions, but not the other possible determinants of income, to test their relationships with output.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), for example, use the
mortality rates of European settlers in their colonies to explain the variTable 4.4 sources of Low Growth Rates
Source
Transmission mechanisms Authors
Geography Soil fertility
Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (2000)
Water availability
Sachs (2001)
Health
Economic Economies of scale
openness Technological innovation

Sachs and Warner (1995)
Frankel and Romer (1999)

Institutions Property rights
Quality of governance

North (1990)
Knack and Keefer (1995)
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ation in institutions. They reason that colonies that were located in areas
with high disease rates were more likely to be “extractive states” where
the colonizers sought to obtain natural resources with little development of supportive institutions. Colonies with better health conditions,
however, were more likely to be settled by Europeans who sought to
replicate the institutions they had left behind. These early conditions
influenced the evolution of institutions after the colonies achieved independence. Using this identification strategy, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson examine the determinants of per capita GDP in 1995 in 64
countries, and report that institutional development had a positive and
statistically significant impact: countries with better institutions had
higher income levels. Geography and health conditions, on the other
hand, were not significant.
Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) undertake tests of the determinants of per capita GDP in 72 countries using variables such as settler mortality rates to explain institutional development. They report
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that institutions play a direct causal
role in the determination of real per capita output. They also find that
geographical factors only influence growth indirectly through their
impact on institutions. In a third paper, Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004) report that the quality of institutions “trumps” the other
possible determinants of income, including openness and integration.
While no consensus ever remains unchallenged, these studies produce consistent results. The World Bank (2005) has summarized the
findings of this body of research: “Recent econometric and case studies have shown that even when controlling for historical endogeneity,
institutions remain ‘deep’ causal factors, while openness and geography
operate at best through them” (p. 57).

INsTITuTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The econometric evidence, therefore, indicates that differences in
institutional development account for the dispersion in global income.
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), however, caution that their
results have limited practical guidance for those who wish to promote
growth through improving the quality of institutions. They claim that
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“there is growing evidence that desirable institutional arrangements
have a large element of context specificity, arising from differences
in historical trajectories, geography, political economy, or other initial
conditions” (p. 157).
In a survey of the research done on institutional development, Shirley
(2005) summarizes the explanations that have been advanced for underdeveloped institutions, such as colonial heritages plus resources that
could be exploited by colonizers who designed institutions to appropriate these resources; a lack of political competition, which would have
placed constraints on political powers; and beliefs and norms that were
not hospitable to the formation of institutions (p. 617). The proximate
historical causes of institutional development, on the other hand, are
greater equality combined with sufficient political competition to limit
the ability of rulers to expropriate, combined with long periods of time
(p. 625).
Shirley (2005) also supports Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi’s
(2004) point that the development of institutions depends on domestic
conditions. She cites several examples where the transfer of existing
institutions from one country to another failed to take root, including
the experience of Latin American countries with the U.S. constitution
and the record of the transition economies with U.S. and European
bankruptcy laws and commercial codes. She cites the need for what
Levy and Spiller (1994) call a “goodness of fit” between specific institutional changes and a country’s overall environment.
Outside agents, such as the intergovernmental organizations, have
become aware of the need for good institutions for progress to be made
in fostering growth and alleviating poverty. The World Bank undertakes
extensive research on this topic and maintains databases on the quality of governance and institutions. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2002, for example, was subtitled Building Institutions for
Markets. But Shirley (2005) is pessimistic about the ability of foreign
organizations to induce institutional improvement, since most institutional changes take place over longer time frames than the horizon
of aid projects. Honda (2008) studies the impact of IMF programs on
economic governance and finds no evidence of a significant impact for
nonconcessional lending. Only the IMF’s concessional lending to the
poorest countries had a significant impact on improving the rule of law
and the control of corruption.
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Another cautionary note comes from the literature on the impact of
foreign aid on governance and development. Knack (2001) reports that
higher aid levels had a negative impact on the quality of governance.
Easterly (2006) has written extensively about the failures of foreignfinanced development projects to improve economic performance in
the countries where they have taken place. Burnside and Dollar (2000)
seem to have found a solution when they report evidence that aid was
effective if the recipient countries had implemented good macroeconomic and trade policies. But Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004)
find that those results were not robust to the addition of new countries
and observations to the original data set.
However, there may be long-term links between globalization and
governance over time. Wei (2000), for example, looks at the impact of
what he terms “natural openness,” that is, the level of trade openness
that a country should have based on its size, geographic location, and
linguistic characteristics. He finds a negative and significant linkage
between natural openness and the prevalence of corruption, as measured
by Business International and Transparency International corruption
indexes. Wei attributes this linkage to decisions by more open economies to promote good governance and minimize corruption in order to
advance their trade with other countries. He suggests that the process
of globalization would provide similar incentives to other economies.
Bonaglia, de Macedo, and Bussolo (2001) also examine the impact
of openness (imports/GDP) on corruption, as measured by the Transparency International and the International Country Risk Guide, and
find that countries with a higher degree of openness record lower levels of corruption. They caution, however, that reducing trade barriers
may not bring an immediate reduction in corruption, and that domestic
policies may be more important in the short run. Similarly, Al-Marhubi
(2004) finds that countries that are more open have better governance.
The IMF (2005), in an analysis of the determinants of institutional
transitions, finds that trade openness is associated with a greater likelihood of improved institutions. The authors attribute this to less corruption in the export sector and the reduction of the ability of domestic producers to sustain monopolistic rents, which could be used to influence
governments. They also find that transitions are more likely to occur
when they also take place in neighboring countries.
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But international trade can also have negative effects on the development of good institutions. Pogge (2002, 2005) points out that the sale
of natural resources can support dictatorial regimes. First, the existence
of such resources is an incentive for civil strife, as the winner can take
control of state-owned properties, including publicly owned resources.
Second, the revenues received by an unrepresentative government
allow it to remain in power, even in the face of dissent.
Saudi Arabia, for example, received scores of 7 and 6 on the Freedom House 2007 ratings for political rights and civil liberties, where
the ratings range from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest).4 The
government’s ability to remain in power rests in part on its oil revenues,
which it uses to distribute services to the population. The dependence
of energy consumers in the upper-income countries on foreign oil contributes to the Saudi government’s survival.
Globalization in earlier eras may have played a role in how institutions evolved in those countries that were colonies. The maps of modern Africa and other areas were drawn by their former colonial powers when they existed. These national lines often ignored domestic
ethnic divisions and other historical factors. The resulting geographic
divisions were not consistent with past governing structures, and as a
result domestic governments did not have a unified basis of support
within their populations. An even more invidious cause of underdevelopment has been suggested by Nunn (2008), who finds evidence of a
link between African poverty and slavery. He finds that those countries
that were the major sources of slaves now are among the poorest, and
suggests that the underdevelopment of political structures in the major
slave-exporters may be a reason for this linkage.

GLOBALIzATION AND THE POOR
Even if institutions determine the level of economic activity in the
long run, globalization can still have an impact on the poorer nations.
The primary channel of transmission is the impact of globalization
upon growth, and the evidence generally confirms that open economies
grow faster and see a decline in the incidence of poverty (see Dollar and
Kraay 2004). The World Bank (2005) finds that growth was responsible
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for almost all the significant reductions in poverty in the 1990s, including those that occurred in China and India.
However, the implications of this finding are the subject of much
debate and controversy. In the 1980s, many policymakers and analysts
believed that removing barriers to international trade and capital flows,
as well as lifting regulations on interest rates and other market-oriented
measures, would lead to faster growth. Many of these recommended
policy measures were summarized by Williamson (1990) as the “Washington Consensus.”5 The experience of the East Asian economies that
had grown so rapidly was cited as proof that integration with the global
economy would raise growth in developing countries.
But the record of the 1990s raised questions about the results of
removing financial barriers. The financial crises that occurred, for
example, in Mexico in 1994–1995, East Asia in 1997–1998, and Argentina in 2001 severely depressed the standard of living in those countries.
Baldacci, de Mello, and Inchauste (2002) have reported that such financial crises are linked to an increase in poverty and income inequality.
These crises showed that short-term capital outflows could seriously disrupt the economies of countries such as Thailand and Indonesia, which had removed controls on capital flows. On the other hand,
China and India, both of which maintained capital controls, were relatively unscathed by the crisis. Malaysia imposed capital controls during
the crisis in 1998 to slow the flight of capital. While there were concerns at the time that the country had cut itself off from future international investments, its economy revived and international capital flows
resumed.
Subsequently, there was a reaction to what was called the “market
fundamentalism” of the earlier period, particularly with respect to capital
flows. The recent U.S. subprime mortgage crisis shows that even financial institutions in developed countries engage in risky transactions that
can become full-blown crises. The IMF, which had previously encouraged its members to dismantle capital controls, revised its approach
(see Joyce and Noy [2008]). The Fund now emphasizes the sequencing
of reforms before financial globalization in order to minimize financial
sector instability. The reform measures include “ . . . the development
of financial markets and institutions; prudential regulation and supervision; risk management and good practices in accounting, auditing, and
disclosure; and financial safety nets” (IMF 2002, p. 3).
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The impact of trade liberalization on the poorest nations is usually
seen as more favorable, particularly for those that export agricultural
goods. However, deregulation can affect some groups within a country,
such as those who might pay higher food prices. Winters, McCulloch,
and McKay (2004) review the evidence for all the linkages between
trade liberalization and poverty, and present a carefully worded appraisal: “Theory provides a strong presumption that trade liberalization
will be poverty-alleviating in the long-run and on average. The empirical evidence broadly supports this view, and, in particular, lends no support to the position that trade liberalization generally has an adverse
impact. Equally, however, it does not assert that trade policy is always
among the most important determinants of poverty reduction or that
the static and micro-economic effects of liberalization will always be
beneficial for the poor” (p. 107).
The impact of globalization on poverty and inequality, therefore, is
far from settled, either among economists or the wider public. Aisbett
(2007), who studies criticisms made of globalization, points out that
“ . . . much work remains to show which policies can reduce the adjustment costs borne by the poor and maximize the share of the benefits they
obtain from globalization” (p. 67). Bardhan (2006), who examines the
linkages between poverty and globalization, concludes, “ . . . globalization is not the main cause of developing countries’ problems, contrary
to the claim of critics of globalization—just as globalization is often not
the main solution to these problems, contrary to the claim of overenthusiastic free traders” (p. 90).

MANAGING GLOBALIzATION
Can globalization be managed to play a positive role in ending poverty? Rodrik (2007) agrees with those who believe that growth is the
most powerful mechanism to reduce poverty and that globalization provides opportunities for increasing growth rates. However, he also has
pointed out that there are many different ways to achieve growth, and
governments need to choose the policies and institutions appropriate
for their nations to take advantage of the opportunities of globalization.
His calls for pragmatism and experimentation are similar to the views
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of Easterly (2006), who criticizes outside attempts to impose solutions
on countries.
Are there steps the upper-income countries could take that would
help the poor countries? Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005)
warn that some of the proposed measures, such as liberalizing trade,
may not have the impact that their advocates envision. Many of the
poorest countries, for example, are importers of agricultural products,
and removing the subsidies paid to the agricultural sector within the
United States and the European Union would only raise prices on those
products at a time when world food prices are already rapidly rising
(Economist 2008).
On the other hand, Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005) also
point to concrete steps that would make the international economy more
rewarding for poor countries. First, they claim that the upper-income
nations can promote good institutions by monitoring and restricting the
payments of bribes to officials in developing nations. Second, they propose that the governments of the wealthy countries promote research
on issues and problems most relevant to the global poor but which their
own governments cannot afford. One way to accomplish this would
be to guarantee the purchase from private companies of technological
innovations that benefit the poor. Finally, the current regulations that
govern international migration should be overhauled. The governments
of countries that attract migrants can collaborate with the governments
of their home countries to devise contract labor schemes that allow
workers to enter the host country for some period of time, benefitting
both countries.
Globalization will continue, with benefits for countries that may
not have participated in the global economy to date. The World Bank
(2007) estimates that the share of developing countries in global output
will increase from about one-fifth to one-third by 2030. Similarly, it
forecasts that the global trade of goods and services will rise by three
times to approximately $27 trillion in 2030, and half of that increase
will come from developing nations.
However, the World Bank (2007) warns that the benefits of
increased economic integration are likely to be uneven across different
areas. In addition, the prevalence of inequality within nations may rise.
“[S]trong forces in the global economy may tend to increase inequality
in many national economies. Even though a large segment of the devel-
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oping world is likely to enter what can be called the ‘global middle
class,’ some social groups may be left behind or even marginalized in
the growth process” (p. xvi).
Managing the process of globalization to benefit the maximum
number of people and diminish the gap in incomes across nations,
therefore, is a challenge for all nations. This challenge has been exacerbated by the downturn in world trade and capital flows during the global
financial crisis. How governments and intergovernmental organizations
respond will determine whether that gap diminishes or grows larger
over time.

Notes
1. These figures are taken from Maddison (2007) and are calculated in 1990 international dollars.
2. These data are obtained from the World Development Indicators and are calculated in constant 2000 dollars.
3. Weil (2008) provides a comprehensive review of this subject.
4. See http://www.freedomhouse.org.
5. However, Williamson (1990) does not include the removal of controls on all capital inflows.
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The Composition and Allocation
of Global Financial Flows
What Are Markets Doing?
Linda Tesar
University of Michigan

This chapter focuses on global financial flows and how they have
changed in response to the series of financial crises that swept through
emerging markets in the mid- to late 1990s. There have been some significant changes in the direction and the composition of capital flow,
and this chapter argues that some of those changes can be understood
as the response of markets to fundamental weaknesses in the global
financial system—weaknesses that have not been adequately addressed
by multilateral institutions or by individual governments.
Development is fundamentally about moving resources to the
places where they are needed most. Somehow the movement of those
resources needs to be financed, whether as outright transfers, through
loans, through direct investment in foreign corporations, or through
securities markets. The nature of development finance has changed dramatically over time, and we have learned, sometimes through painful
experience, about how the composition of capital flow from rich to poor
countries matters. While the composition of capital flow is by definition
a “macro” phenomenon, I suggest that micro evidence on the way firms
structure their lending to emerging markets contains important clues
about the vulnerabilities of the global financial environment, and how
firms have responded to those weaknesses.
The financial crises that swept through East Asia and Latin America
in the mid- to late 1990s interrupted global flows, but one feature that
stands out is the resilience of, and even the expansion of, foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows. One can think of the policy reforms applied to
emerging markets in two phases: first as the “Washington Consensus
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I,” which emphasized getting prices right (the Washington Consensus
is explained further in the following section). We learned from financial
crises that getting prices right is not enough, and there is a new perspective that I have labeled “Washington Consensus II,” which is about
getting institutions right. The world made progress with phase I, the
opening of markets, but has been less successful with phase II. Failure
to adequately address institutions has not stopped capital flow, but it has
changed the nature of that flow.

GLOBAL FINANCIAL FLOWs AND THE
WAsHINGTON CONsENsus
Historically, flows to developing countries moved through official channels—from multilateral agencies or governments to recipient
governments. Bank lending and FDI played a role, but official flows
accounted for the majority of capital flow to developing countries. In
the 1990s, the composition of capital flow began to shift away from
official assistance toward private capital flow. Much of this shift was
due to the dramatic changes in policy that occurred under the “Washington Consensus,” a term coined by John Williamson (2002) at the
Institute for International Economics. It was a convenient label for the
broad set of policies supported by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF for
reforming economies in emerging markets.
The Washington Consensus covered three broad areas, the first of
which was that developing countries should have greater macroeconomic discipline, including a reduction in fiscal deficits, reprioritization
of expenditures, and tax reform. The second major component was to
encourage policies that foster the market economy to liberalize interest
rates, liberalize the banking system, deregulate financial institutions,
privatize government-run enterprises, and encourage greater securitization. In other words, the reforms were intended to create a greater role
for market-determined prices to affect allocations. One of the key prices
in small open economies is the exchange rate, although the debate still
ensues today about the best way to manage exchange rates.
Finally, the consensus supported opening the economy to the global
marketplace through trade liberalization and, to some extent, capital
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account liberalization. Ex post, there is now a heated debate about
whether capital account liberalization is a good idea and if so, how it
should best be accomplished, but ex ante, many economists believed
that emerging market economies would benefit from lifting restrictions
on the extent of foreign control, allowing foreigners to become shareholders in local firms and encouraging the entry of foreign banks. In
response to pressure from the IMF and other institutions, many countries undertook massive privatization programs and liberalized their
capital markets. These privatization programs took place in conjunction
with the removal of capital account restrictions that permitted increased
market access to foreign investors.
Economists predicted that such reforms would generate a number
of benefits for emerging markets. Economic theory suggests that opening to global financial markets should stimulate the flow of capital from
capital-rich to capital-poor countries and reduce the cost of capital in
markets where it is scarce. The reforms should increase the efficiency of
the financial sector and facilitate the transfer of technology. A secondorder effect is to help diversify risk by reducing local investors’ exposure to country-specific risk. At a minimum, these reforms, even if they
do not change the long-run growth rate, would speed the transition to
the country’s long-run steady state by an inflow of foreign capital. The
more optimistic view is that financial liberalization and openness could
potentially increase economic growth rates.
Many countries took this policy advice and opened their markets.
The number of countries with stock markets open to foreign investors
increased from 14 in 1980 (essentially the largest OECD countries) to
35 in 1992, leveling off to 41 in the late 1990s (Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad 2005). Chinn and Ito (2006) develop an alternative measure
of openness, taking into account policy differences across countries in
the various components of the capital account (see Figure 5.1). Their
measure captures the opening of the capital accounts, particularly in
Latin America and East Europe.1
Net resource flows to developing countries, and most notably flows
to emerging markets, increased dramatically from the early 1980s to
the mid-1990s (see Figure 5.2). If we strategically stop time in 1997, it
appears that capital flow responded as economists predicted it would:
with a quadrupling of total flow from $75 billion in 1990 to over $300
billion in 1997. Looking at flows by type, FDI followed a similar path,
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Figure 5.1 Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index
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increasing from less than $50 billion to more than $150 billion over the
same period. International investment in portfolio equity, which was
virtually nonexistent in the 1980s, accounted for an increasing share
of capital flow in the early 1990s. At its peak in 1993, equity flows
accounted for 20 percent of total capital inflow in developing countries.
Privatization and increased foreign investment led to a boom in
emerging stock markets. The growth in stock market capitalization of
emerging markets, which reflects the increase in the number of firms
listed on the market as well as the change in stock prices, was a staggering 250 percent over the 1990–1996 period. The U.S. equity market,
enjoying its own stock market boom over this period, grew about 170
percent, with slower rates of growth in the United Kingdom and Japan.
Foreign markets, particularly emerging markets, looked like a good
investment, and U.S. investors responded. Home bias, measured as the
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Figure 5.2 Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 1980–2005
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fraction of U.S. equities in the U.S. portfolio, declined from 97 percent
in the 1980s to about 88 percent in 1995.
Despite the increased flows to developing markets, international
capital markets were still dominated by flows between industrialized
countries. Of the total global outflow of FDI of $322 billion in 1995, 94
percent, or $302 billion, was invested in industrialized countries. Similarly, 96 percent of outward investment in portfolio equity was invested
in industrialized countries. So, while there was some seepage of global
flows into developing countries, the volume of that flow remained relatively small.
Capital markets also did not deliver on the promise of redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor. A Lorenz curve of the distribution
of wealth for 59 countries, which shows the fraction of global wealth
accounted for by each decile of countries ranked by wealth, shows very
little change between 1970 and 1995 (Figure 5.3). Wealth here includes
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Figure 5.3 Lorenz Curve for Global Wealth, 1970 and 1995
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the capitalized value of a country’s capital stock as well as its stock
of foreign assets. If wealth were distributed approximately evenly,
the poorest 10 percent of countries would have 10 percent of global
wealth. (If the distribution were exactly equal, the Lorenz curve would
lie along the 45 degree line and there would be no distinction between
the rich and the poor.) The data suggest that 10 percent of global wealth
is shared by the bottom 50 percent of countries. These figures are an
underestimate of the uneven distribution of wealth, because the sample
excludes most of sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest countries in Asia, and
Eastern Europe because of the lack of information on capital stocks and
net foreign assets in those regions.
Even if one thought that wealth might not be affected by the opening of capital markets, one would hope that the allocation of capital
would be affected. That is, open capital markets would encourage
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investment in capital-scarce countries even if ownership of that capital,
and therefore wealth, remained in the hands of investors in industrialized countries. Unfortunately, the data suggest that there was also very
little change in the distribution of capital across countries between 1970
and 1995. In 1995, the richest 50 percent of countries accounted for 85
percent of the global capital stock.
Of course, the clock did not stop in the mid-1990s, and beginning
with the Mexican crisis in December 1994, global markets were buffeted with a series of financial shocks that seemed to spread from one
market to the next. These crises resulted in (or some would say were
caused by) a sudden reversal of capital flow from emerging markets,
speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates and the central banks that
supported them, collapses in the financial sectors of many Latin American and Southeast Asian countries, liquidity crises, and ultimately
widespread defaults. The cause of these crises remains a topic of heated
discussion and is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The “sudden stop” in capital flow to emerging markets resulted in a
dramatic reduction in total flows to developing countries, from a peak
of $310 billion in 1997 to less than $200 billion in 2001. Flows of longterm debt fell in 1999 and became negative in 2001. Portfolio equity
flows were reduced to a trickle. Interestingly, while the other types of
flow declined, FDI remained steady from 1997 on and took a sharp
turn upward in 2003. This is seen even more clearly when one looks
at the decomposition of flows by type (i.e., as a percentage of total
flow). Throughout the entire 1980–2001 period, FDI as a fraction of
total inflow steadily increased, and by 2001 it accounted for 80 percent
of the total volume of flow to developing countries. The remainder of
the chapter examines why, and how one should think about FDI flows
in this environment.
To understand FDI flows, it helps to make the distinction between
greenfield investments, the inflow of new investments, and “brownfield” investments, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that reflect the
purchase of existing plants and equipment. Throughout the late 1990s
the fraction of FDI that is accounted for by the acquisition of firms
in emerging markets by firms in industrialized countries increased. In
1999, over 90 percent of FDI in Asia was due to cross-border M&As.
The rise in cross-border M&As as a form of external finance was
in part due to changes in the regulations affecting foreign ownership.
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In many countries in East Asia, foreign investors were explicitly prohibited from gaining a controlling share in local firms. For example, in
1996 the ceiling on the amount of stock foreigners could acquire in all
Korean companies without the approval of the board of directors was
only 18 percent. Another feature of the market for corporate control in
Korea was that cross-holdings across business groups (Chaebols) were
substantial. This situation changed dramatically as a consequence of
the financial crises that swept the region during 1997. The IMF bailout
packages to Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia included explicit provisions for restructuring domestic capital markets and to allow foreign
competition in the market for corporate control.
Another feature of FDI inflows is that they are lumpy; that is, a
single transaction in a small market can have a huge impact on aggregate flow. Argentina is an interesting example. In 1999, forecasts about
Argentina’s near economic future and the viability of its currency board
were grim. Debt flows steeply declined and portfolio inflows turned
negative. Foreign direct investment, however, surged upward to unprecedented levels. A careful look at the data reveals that the sale of YPF,
an oil and gas company, to Repsol, a Spanish enterprise, accounted for
63 percent of total FDI inflow in that year. Had Repsol not made the
purchase, net flows to Argentina would have been close to zero.
The next question is how to interpret the boom in foreign acquisitions in emerging markets. Many views in the press range from firms
now having access to the “exciting opportunities” in emerging markets,
to a fire sale of assets resulting from the liquidity crises, to the fear of
“recolonization” by foreign entities (the latter is attributed to Malaysia’s
Prime Minister Mahathir). Economists also express a range of opinions,
from FDI as the “good cholesterol” (borrowing may not be good for
you, but if you have to do it FDI is the least dangerous form) to a more
neutral perspective (FDI is simply the transfer of assets from domestic
to foreign hands and therefore may have little real economic impact) to
a more positive view that FDI enables the transfer of technology and
creates synergies between parents and their affiliates.
To try to shed light on the factors that drive cross-border M&As, I
explore three questions. First, is there value creation from the transfer
of assets from domestic to foreign hands? Second, if there is value creation, who captures the gains—targets in emerging markets or acquirers from industrialized countries? And finally, are there special circum-
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stances under which gains exist, and why? To get at these questions,
I will use the stock price reaction of acquirer and target firms to the
announcement of an M&A transaction as a summary statistic for the
value created through cross-border M&A activity.
The results in this chapter are drawn from Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar
(2009). The returns are cumulated average abnormal returns over a
three-day event window around the announcement date.2 Our data set
includes all acquisitions of firms in 42 emerging markets in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America by firms from nine industrialized countries. The sample period covers 1986–2006, making it possible to test for the effects
of financial crisis on the gains from an acquisition. The data set includes
various firm, industry, and transactions characteristics. We also have
data for a control group that includes domestic and other industrializedcountry acquisitions by U.S. and European firms. This allows us to compare the gains from acquiring a target in an emerging market relative to
the gains from acquiring a target in another industrialized country.
Our analysis yields three main findings. First, there is value creation from cross-border M&As in emerging markets. Between 1986
and 2006, developed market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16 percent, on average, over a three-day
event window.
Our second finding is that shareholders of acquiring firms reap the
lion’s share of the gains, and this gain is associated with acquiring control. The median acquirer records cumulative abnormal returns of 0.72
percent in transactions where control is acquired, while the median
cumulative abnormal return for acquirers in transactions where control
is not acquired is 0.02 percent. Over the period we study, the cumulated dollar value gain from cross-border acquisitions in emerging markets where control was acquired was $10.5 billion for developed market shareholders. Note that this is in stark contrast to the results from
the domestic M&A literature where studies find that M&As are value
destroying and that the gains, if any, accrue to the target’s shareholders
(Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2005). This suggests that something
very different is going on in the emerging market context. The effect
appears to be closely related to corporate control.
Finally, we find that the gains for acquirers are largest in R&D
intensive sectors, conditional on gaining control. To obtain this result,
we first estimate R&D intensity at the industry level based on a cross-
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section of U.S. industries. We then use those estimates as a measure of
R&D intensity of targets (by industry). When we include this measure
of R&D intensity as a control variable in the regression, we find that
corporate control, crossed with R&D intensity, is a significant explanator of acquirer gains. One interpretation of this finding is that there are
productive synergies from M&As that involve the transfer of technology, but these synergies are only realized (and the technology is transferred) when the acquirer obtains control.
How can we interpret these findings? In Financial Crisis, Liquidity and the International Monetary Problem, Jean Tirole (2001) offers
insight into the potential causes of market failure in emerging markets
that has direct bearing on the decision to acquire a foreign firm. First,
he assumes that there are many lenders, and that lenders do not coordinate their actions. On the borrowing side, he assumes that the local
government can take actions that affect the payoffs of the firm, and that
the incentives of the government are not fully aligned with those of the
firm. Two problems then arise. First, the lack of coordination among
lenders means that each lender is uncertain about the borrowing country’s overall level of indebtedness, and each lender is uncertain about
the relative seniority of his or her own claim. This situation can lead to
sunspot equilibria, speculative attacks, and contagion as each investor
tries to infer from inexact signals whether or not his or her claim will be
honored. The second problem is that lenders would like to contract with
the firm, but the government is an implicit partner in the arrangement.
Thus, the lender is exposed to expropriation risk; that is, actions that are
not in the best interest of the firm.
Foreign direct investment, in the form of acquiring control of the
emerging market firm, offers a way out of these two problems. By contracting explicitly with the shareholders of the target firm, FDI essentially cuts out other lenders (minimizing the multiple lender problem).
In gaining majority ownership of the firm, shareholders of the acquiring firm are able to extend the boundary of the firm into the emerging
market, effectively replacing the government of the target-firm nation
with that of the acquirer. This is not to say that all expropriation risk
is eliminated—the target’s government could still violate international
law, for example, and nationalize the target. But by consolidating the
balance sheets of the target and the acquirer, the acquisition effectively
extends the reach of the acquirer’s home institutions into the borrower’s
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market. In a sense, the target imports the corporate and legal institutions
from the acquirer.
Foreign direct investment is not, however, a panacea for the weak
institutions problem plaguing emerging markets. It is relatively immobile, may be inflexible, and may not help a country diversify its risk.
It also comes at a price. In order to attract FDI and to compensate for
the weak institutions problem, target shareholders in emerging markets
give up both control and, relative to target shareholders in industrial
countries, returns. The only complete solution is for governments in
emerging markets to address the weaknesses in their contracting environment, to offer greater property rights protection, and to make firms
less vulnerable to capricious changes in government policy.
Another recent phenomenon, which I believe is also a symptom of
the weak institutions problem, is the dramatic rise in foreign reserve
accumulation in developing countries. According to neoclassical theory,
capital-scarce countries should be net borrowers, not net lenders. Yet
what we see is the accumulation of large holdings of dollar reserves by
foreign governments, particularly in developing countries. Economists
continue to debate about the explanation of these reserve holdings, but
one plausible explanation is that in a world where financial meltdowns
are a possibility, foreign reserves serve as collateral and provide a signal to foreign investors that the countries’ balance sheets are sound.

suMMARy
The composition of global financial flows to emerging markets
changed dramatically in the postfinancial crisis period. External finance
is now much more likely to take the form of the sale of domestic assets,
with control rights shifting to the acquiring firm. In my view, this
change in the composition of flows is a natural response to institutional
weaknesses in emerging markets. Control of foreign subsidiaries allows
for both capital flow and for the protection of property rights of the
acquiring firm, but it is not a perfect substitute for strong institutions
that would extend to all firms in emerging markets.
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Notes
1. For more details on their index, see Chinn and Ito (2006).
2. Our working paper includes robustness checks for different windows around the
announcement date.
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Are Developing
Countries Converging on
Intellectual Property Rights?
Evidence from Plant Patents, 1977–2007
Lisa D. Cook
Michigan State University

For decades, researchers have attempted to develop better, more
efficient sources of biofuels. On one hand, this development could represent a significant boon for developing countries. For example, sorghum in the Philippines has been found to have higher sugar content
in its root than sugar cane, which is one of the best sources for efficient production of cellulosic biofuels. Economists have long advised
developing countries, among others, to become less dependent on fossil
fuels, whether in consumption or production. In addition, some types
of biofuels may increase opportunities in production, employment, and
research in the home country.
On the other hand, this could be problematic for developing countries. Provisions of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to increase protection of intellectual property rights in developing countries and emerging markets have been
expensive to implement. Finger (2004) estimates that the annual cost
to the least developed countries would be $60 billion. Nogués (1993)
finds that Argentine pharmaceutical consumers transfer $425 million
yearly to foreign patent holders. With little home-country capacity or
legal framework to issue patents and protect ideas, foreign (and domestic) residents may seek greater protection abroad. Such a move could
increase the price of both R&D and the use of plant varieties, reducing
gains to output, employment, and R&D. Despite widespread ratification
of the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), some develop-
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ing countries argue that royalties are still underpaid due to biopiracy
and bioprospecting.
How have developing countries responded to the opportunity and
challenge of greater intellectual property protection? Have foreign patent offices become complements or substitutes for domestic patent
offices? This chapter examines the empirical record of this response.
Using data on intellectual property related to plants, I find that
there is increased activity in protecting intellectual property in and by
developing countries after laws related to intellectual property are introduced. In Brazil, India, and Mexico, there is a noticeable TRIPS effect.
Protected inventions increased at home and abroad after TRIPS passage
in 1997. This finding implies that foreign patent offices are complements in most countries.
The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section briefly
describes the methods available to protect ideas related to plants, and
the second section describes the data on intellectual property. The third
section presents the evidence, and the last section describes opportunities for future research.

PROTECTION OF PLANTs
The TRIPS agreement states that “Members shall provide for the
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui
generis system or by any combination thereof.” There are four main
means by which plant-related innovations may be protected: 1) patents,
2) plant breeders’ rights (PBR), 3) trade secrets, and 4) trademarks.
Among patents, there are two types that are relevant for plants: utility and plant. Utility patents are granted to plant-related inventions that
meet the standards of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. These
can either be process, such as a method of using a plant or plant part
in a breeding process that includes a step of sexual hybridization, or
product, such as plant, seedling, plant seed, or plant part, per se, patents.1 According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, plant patents
are for products only and are granted to inventors who have “invented
or discovered and asexually reproduced a distinct and new variety
of plant.”2 An additional requirement is that the plant must be stable.
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Among developed countries, only the United States, Japan, and Australia recognize plant patents, and no developing country recognizes them
(World Bank 2006, p. 25).
The criteria for plant variety protection (PVP) are uniformity, stability, and distinctness. TRIPs compliance requires that countries offer
some form of protection to breeders, and many countries selected this
option. Plant variety protection is the principal means by which plants
are protected in the EU and in many developing countries. The first
plant variety act was enacted in 1973, and many of these countries have
joined or are in the process of joining the International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). Others, such as India,
Taiwan, and Thailand, have adopted national PVP programs. While
PVP certifications are considered less restrictive than patents, costs
associated with application vary significantly and can be prohibitive.
The application fee represents 3 percent of GDP per capita in China and
Colombia and 16 percent in Kenya. The annual maintenance fee represents up to 13 percent of GDP per capita in China, 16 percent in Kenya,
and 0 percent in the United States.3
Trade secrets are another way plants might be protected. That is,
fines may be imposed if nonpublic information about plant varieties is
made public. This type of protection is often sought when replication is
difficult, such as with hybrids.
Trademarks and geographic designations are words or symbols
used to identify novel or geographic characteristics of plant varieties
to consumers—for example, Michigan cherries, Egyptian cotton, and
Ethiopian coffee.
While all aforementioned forms of protection are simultaneously possible, the focus of the analysis here will be patents and PVP
certifications.

DATA
Patents for innovations related to plants are prohibited in most
countries in our sample. Therefore, all patent data used in this analysis
are patents issued to residents of developing countries and emerging
markets by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). For plant
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patents, application data are only available from 2002. Rejection rates
are calculated as the ratio of patent grants to patent applications in a
given year. The rejection rate is intended to capture the quality of plant
patents being issued by the United States.
Data on PVP certifications have been obtained from UPOV and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Data on laws related
to laws and agreements have been collected from the CBD, Farmers’
Rights, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., WIPO, and
the WTO.
Additional data, such as patents per resident and R&D expenditure
as a fraction of GDP, have been gleaned from various sources to present
the broader context in which decisions about plant-related intellectual
property protection are being made.

EVIDENCE
Table 6.1 provides background data on the 14 developing countries
and emerging markets in the sample. There is significant heterogeneity
among countries for all measures: income per capita, share of agriculture in GDP, patents granted to residents per million, R&D expenditure
as a fraction of GDP, and number of R&D researchers per million.
Since 1975, the quantity of plant-related innovations receiving
intellectual-property rights protection has been rising in emerging markets and developing countries both at home and abroad. Figure 6.1
reports data on plant patents obtained in the United States, utility patents related to plants obtained in the United States, and PVP certifications issued in the home country. The patterns observed in the data suggest that innovations with weaker protection, PVP certifications, began
to increase earlier than those seeking stronger protection through patents issued in the United States. While plant and utility patents began to
rise significantly in the mid-1990s, PVP certifications began climbing
significantly in the mid-1980s. Interestingly, the PVP data correspond
more closely to plant and total patenting patterns in the United States,
and the patent data in this sample follow plant and total plant patenting
patterns in the United States with a lag of approximately 10 years.
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Figure 6.2 gives data on applications for, grants of, and rejection
rates for plant patents. Although patent protection of plant innovations
is increasing, it is unclear whether the quality of these innovations is
increasing. While the rejection rate as calculated is an imperfect measure of quality of innovations, it should give an indication of whether
simply more plant-related ideas are seeking protection rather than better
ideas. The high degree of variation between 2002 and 2006, the only
years for which there are data, makes inference difficult. Rejection
rates for all U.S. utility patents are available for a longer period and are
recorded in Figure 6.3. Rejection rates were largely stable at around 60
percent in the 1990s but climbed to 70 percent by the mid-2000s.4
Developing countries and emerging markets have received plantrelated utility patents in all subcategories. However, shares attributed
to developing countries and emerging markets are relatively low in
most subcategories and are largest in mushrooms, pepper, and conifers.
These data appear in Figure 6.4.
For each country, we are interested in answering the following
questions: Are there significant differences in intellectual-property protection sought at home and abroad? Do inventors respond to measures
adopted to increase protection of plant-related ideas? Are these patterns
different across countries? Figures 6.5–6.10 present data for each country in the sample and include dates of implementation of the UPOV,
TRIPS, CBD, and national PVP certifications.
For Argentina and Brazil, most of the activity in IP protection of
plants is in PVP certifications. In both countries, plant-related utility
patents rose after 1999. Among the countries in the sample, Argentina
and Israel are the earliest users of plant protection in the home country. In India and Taiwan, all the activity related to protection of plant
innovations is in protection sought abroad. For Brazil, India, and Mexico, nearly all plant IP activity is concentrated in the post-TRIPS era.
Following membership in UPOV, PVP certificates in Israel rose above
nonzero levels consistently for more than 20 years. Of course, a formal
multivariate econometric test would be warranted to ascribe causality,
but the country-specific graphical analysis is suggestive.
The findings in this study are broadly consistent with the recent
literature on plant-related intellectual property rights, such as Helfer
(2002) and World Bank (2006). Particularly on the issue of patents,
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Table 6.1 Country Data, Developing Countries, and Emerging Markets
GDP per
capita, PPPa
$US
2005
1,939
2,119
4,480

Agriculture
% GDP
2005
11.1
6.4b,c
8.7d

Patents granted
to residents per
million population
2005
—
—
—

R&D
expenditure
% GDP
2000–2005
1.02
1.61
0.56

Researchers in
R&D per million
population
1990–2005
—
722
256

34,759
2,808
610

1.7b
9.6
21.4

286
—
—

2.45
0.85
0.73

3,781
725
—

17,828
4,728
7,073
4,627
7,454
4,271
2,682
2,750
2,758
1,302
1,151
5,109

3.0
9.4
5.5
8.7
3.8
8.1
12.5
9.9
6.5
13.4
13.9
2.5

48
—
1
—
1
1
—
1
—
—
—
—

4.46
0.41
0.61
0.39
0.40
0.98
0.17
0.26
0.07
0.05
0.05
0.76

—
720
444
—
268
344
109
287
50
207
—
307

India
Taiwan

736
16,067

18.3
1.7

1
1,865

0.85
2.26

119
3,972e

Purchasing power parity.
2004 data.
c
Asia (excluding Middle East).
d
Only Latin America.
e
1998–2005 data.
SOURCE: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5: World Bank (2007); aggregates calculated from UNDP (2008). Column 3: UNDP (2008). Data on
Taiwan are from Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region (2008) and Taiwan Intellectual Property Office
(2007). Data on population are from United Nations (2007).
a

b
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Figure 6.1 Intellectual Property Related to Plants, Developing Countries
and Emerging Markets, by Application year, 1975–2006
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NOTE: Developing countries and emerging markets for U.S. utility and plant patents
data are Israel, Costa Rica, India, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Indonesia, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ecuador. Developing countries
and emerging markets for PVP certification data are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Israel, Mexico, and South Africa. Patent origin is determined by the
residence of the first-named inventor in case of U.S. plant patent and by the residence
of any inventor in case of U.S. utility patent (plant related). PVP certifications are
presented by grant year.
SOURCE: U.S. Plant patents, 1994–present: UPOV (2009); before 1994: Patent Technology Monitoring Team. PVP certifications, 2002–2006: UPOV (2009); 1975–2001:
WIPO (n.d.). U.S. utility patents related to plants: Data retrieved by the author from
the USPTO Web site: http://www.uspto.gov.
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Figure 6.3 u.s. utility Patents, Grants and Applications, Developing
Countries and Emerging Markets, by Grant year, 1965–2006
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SOURCE: U.S. utility patent data: USPTO (2008b). U.S. utility patent application data:
USPTO (2008c).
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Figure 6.5 Argentina, Intellectual Property, Plants, 1977–2007
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NOTE: Patent origin is determined by the residence of the first-named inventor. CBD,
TRIPS, and UPOV represent the year that the country ratifies the CBD, joins the
World Trade Organization, and joins UPOV. The first national Plant Variety Protection
law was enacted in 1973.
SOURCE: U.S. Plant patents, 1994–present: UPOV (2009); before 1994: Patent Technology Monitoring Team. PVP certifications, 2002–2006: UPOV (2009); 1975–2001:
WIPO (n.d.). U.S. utility patents related to plants: Data retrieved by the author from
the USPTO Web site, http://www.uspto.gov. Law data: Summary from WIPO (2007),
CBD (2009), and Farmers’ Rights (2009).
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Figure 6.6 Brazil, Intellectual Property, Plants, 1977–2007
6

140
National PVP

Number of certifications

UPOV

100

5
4

80
3
60
2

40

1

20
0
1977

Number of patents

CBD

120

TRIPS

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

0
2007

PVP certifications issued to their own residents
U.S. plant patents
U.S. utility patents (plant related)

NOTE: Patent origin is determined by the residence of the first-named inventor. CBD,
TRIPS, and UPOV represent the year that the country ratifies the CBD, joins the
World Trade Organization, and joins UPOV. The first national Plant Variety Protection
law was enacted in 1973.
SOURCE: U.S. Plant patents, 1994–present: UPOV (2009); before 1994: Patent Technology Monitoring Team. PVP certifications, 2002–2006: UPOV (2009); 1975–2001:
WIPO (n.d.). U.S. utility patents related to plants: Data retrieved by the author from
the USPTO Web site, http://www.uspto.gov. Law data: Summary from WIPO (2007),
CBD (2009), and Farmers’ Rights (2009).
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Figure 6.7 India, Intellectual Property, Plants, 1977–2007
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law was enacted in 1973.
SOURCE: U.S. Plant patents, 1994–present: UPOV (2009); before 1994: Patent Technology Monitoring Team. PVP certifications, 2002–2006: UPOV (2009); 1975–2001:
WIPO (n.d.). U.S. utility patents related to plants: Data retrieved by the author from
the USPTO Web site, http://www.uspto.gov. Law data: Summary from WIPO (2007),
CBD (2009), and Farmers’ Rights (2009).
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Figure 6.8 Israel, Intellectual Property, Plants, 1977–2007
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Figure 6.9 Mexico, Intellectual Property, Plants, 1977–2007
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Figure 6.10 Taiwan, Intellectual Property, Plants, 1977–2007
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the conventional wisdom is that developing countries prefer weaker IP
rights and that these will spur innovation. This analysis suggests that a
more nuanced and time-series investigation of the empirical record is in
order and that the issue is not settled.

CONCLusION
An examination of data on intellectual property related to plants
finds that there is increased activity in protecting intellectual property
in and by developing countries. This finding implies that foreign patent offices are complements in most countries. In Brazil, India, and
Mexico, there is a noticeable TRIPS effect, and protected inventions
increase at home and abroad after TRIPS passage in 1997. From the
data it is difficult to glean implications for taking advantage of new biofuel opportunities, for example, beyond protection of ideas. Were these
preexisting ideas or new ideas seeking protection? Did new knowledge
arise as a result of new protection or in spite of it? What are the results
with respect to commercialization? This is still an open research question and deserves further attention in future research.

Notes
The author is grateful to seminar participants at the Werner Sichel Lecture Series
at Western Michigan University and in the Department of Economics at Michigan
State University. Excellent research assistance by Chaleampong Kongcharoen is also
acknowledged.
1. The scope of per se patents is not only the application identified but applications
not yet identified.
2. USPTO definition, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/plant/.
3. World Bank (2006), UNDP (2008), and author’s calculations. GDP per capita data
are for 2005.
4. One must be careful in interpreting the data on rejection rates, as applications and
rejections arrive at irregular and different intervals.
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The Challenges and
Opportunities of Twenty-FirstCentury Global Markets
Hadi Salehi Esfahani
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Are we preparing our younger generations for the challenges and
opportunities of the twenty-first-century global markets? As markets
become increasingly global, tough competition for every skill is emerging from around the world. But fascinating opportunities are also being
formed to serve people in different corners of the globe in new ways.
Are we, as a society and as individuals, developing the right skills and
procedures to deal with the upcoming challenges and to take advantage
of the new global opportunities? Or are we about to see our jobs outsourced and our lives face greater uncertainty?
These are critical questions that all of us living in the early twentyfirst century have to grapple with, one way or another. Global trends
have come to matter in significant ways in our career choices and business decisions, as well as government policies that we advocate. To
think through these issues and to make informed choices as professionals and citizens, we need to have a basic understanding of the main forces
behind global market dynamics. The literature on globalization offers
many perspectives that highlight such forces from different angles. This
chapter brings together a host of those perspectives and makes new
observations regarding the current and future globalization trends. To
start the discussion, it is useful to briefly review the key trends and lessons from the past.
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PAsT GLOBALIzATION TRENDs
The most notable forces behind globalization are improvements in
transportation and information technologies that have brought different
parts of the world into closer contact with each other. This has enabled
companies in each country to see the world market within their reach
and to think globally when choosing what processes to keep inside the
firm, where to locate, and which processes to outsource domestically or
internationally. Such considerations are not just for large corporations
such as Caterpillar or Archer Daniels Midland. Small firms and individuals also need to be aware of their positions in global markets. Many
industries, such as auto parts, have long been involved in that process.
More recently, many products and services that previously enjoyed natural protection in each locality, such as retail sales, have come to face a
much wider competition.
Technology, however, is not the entire story behind globalization.
Government policies and institutional developments have also played
major roles. Even decades ago, when transportation and communications costs were high, they were often minor compared to the myriad of
barriers erected by governments to protect domestic industry or to generate rents and collect revenue. Those barriers have markedly declined
since World War II. Government action has also mattered in terms of
streamlining domestic regulation, law and order, and control of corruption and extortion (or security of property rights in general). Globalization would not have been possible without expanding public support
for liberal trade and without increasing government ability to invest in
public goods and to bring order, efficiency, and security to domestic
markets.
What accounts for the change in public attitudes and the improvement in government capabilities? Concerning attitudes toward trade
policy, the important factors have been improvements in the operation of labor and capital markets and the expansion of social insurance mechanisms such as unemployment insurance and social security.
These factors have mattered because they have reduced the costs of
external shocks on domestic producers. Under liberal trade, innovations
and entries and exits in global markets often force local producers to
respond and compete or go out of business. In either case, access to effi-
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cient sources of credit and insurance can reduce the costs imposed on
local firms and workers and enable them to withstand external shocks,
adjusting to them or moving to new localities and lines of business
where they can compete more effectively. The enhanced efficiency of
capital and labor markets and the expansion of social insurance over
the past several decades have eased such adjustments and account for
the increased palatability of liberal trade policies, especially in more
advanced countries. Lack of similar developments in many poor regions
of the world has either prevented governments from opening up trade
or has rendered local industries vulnerable to external shocks, impeding investment and causing hardship for large parts of the population.
For similar reasons, the pre-WWII free trade under colonial rule did not
bring much prosperity to the Third World.
This discussion raises the question of why many countries have
managed to improve their governance and make globalization possible.
Note that this is a central question because the developments in market
institutions and technology ultimately depend on the capabilities of the
government to establish an enabling environment for innovation and
exchange. Also, it so happens that the full answer to this question has
remained elusive. In fact, if we had a complete answer to this question,
we could devise solutions to governance problems of all countries, and
underdevelopment would be a problem of the past. Of course, we do
have some insights regarding the sources of good governance in parts
of the world. But our knowledge remains limited, and that is a major
reason why spreading good governance has met with limited success.
We know that good governance ultimately requires constraints on
arbitrary rule, that is, separation of powers and checks and balances. We
also know that there must be mechanisms to aggregate the demands and
information of individuals and interest groups regarding what needs to
be achieved through government policy. In addition, there must be procedures for assessing the performance of policymakers and rewarding
them based on their success in delivering socially desirable policies.
However, we don’t know which sets of rules and institutions can ensure
these goals in each society and what the necessary steps are to implement them if the country has not already found a solution. In fact, progress in most societies has been made mostly through experiments and
accidental discovery rather than fully analyzed designs. Typically, the
process has started with periods of massive uprising against arbitrary
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or foreign rulers. The new institutions that have come about in those
ways have often proved to be inadequate, either resulting in deterioration in governance or prompting further change. In some cases, such as
with the United States, the vision of the leaders and the constellation of
forces at the time have produced valuable and lasting results. In other
situations, such as in Cambodia in the 1970s, the uprising has replaced
one inadequate regime with another, far more arbitrary and destructive
one.
The difficulty societies have in attaining good governance lies in
the complexity of the problems that they face. The governance rules
and policies that work in each society must match a myriad of elements
that comprise the society’s economic resources, culture, religion, group
affiliations, and identities. For example, decentralization seems to have
been a very positive force in China’s impressive economic growth. But
in an economically underdeveloped, fragmented, and partially tribal
society such as Pakistan, decentralization may strengthen clannish
social relations that impede education and infrastructure and thereby
deny most of the population the benefits of integration into national and
global markets.
Another major problem in reforming governance is the massive
coordination effort that it requires: An overwhelming majority of the
population must be convinced that the new rules being adopted are
likely to work and that everyone else shares the view that such a consensus exists. This requirement also poses a dilemma: broad coordination often needs to be reached with the help of a charismatic leader or
a well-organized group. Once in the coordinator position, the leader or
the group may come to control the system and have the option to impose
certain rules. This could defeat the purpose of the initial movement to
bring about change. However, in some contexts, the dictatorship of the
coordinator can be crucial in achieving reform, as in Korea, Taiwan,
and Singapore, where the heavy hand of the ruling politicians in the
initial stages has been associated with spectacular takeoffs. Absence of
effective coordination, on the other hand, could undermine economic
growth, as shown with the sharp drop in Indonesia’s economic growth
after democratization in 1998 has shown. Note that these examples also
suggest that in an underdeveloped country, governance improvement
may come about under dictatorship, even though eventually economic
development requires democratization. These observations, together
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with the fact that the conditions of each society are complex and constantly subject to change, highlight the reasons why governance reform
has been so difficult in many countries and has remained an art rather
than a science.
Despite the difficulties in improving governance, there has been a
gradual process of reform in a large part of the world, which has in
turn facilitated international exchanges and has ushered in the current
globalization episode. This process and its concomitant technological and attitude changes have furthermore mounted pressure on other
countries to change and adapt. When a country such as Myanmar does
not respond, it becomes isolated and loses out on the tremendous benefits that interaction with the rest of the world can offer. But simple
responses, such as opening domestic markets to international trade,
do not solve the problem either. Yemen’s economy, for example, has
virtually stagnated since its trade liberalization in the mid-1990s. The
government has been waiting for a surge in private investment to create jobs and motivate the young to acquire education and skills, but the
private sector has focused on imports rather than domestic production,
doubting that the government’s policies would produce a skilled labor
force and a buoyant demand for domestic goods. In any event, the challenges of globalization have increased the urgency of finding solutions
to local economic and governance failures in all countries, and there is
increasing realization that solutions need to be tailored to the specific
conditions at the national and subnational levels.
Although tailoring solutions may seem a reasonable and straightforward point, applying it in practice has not been easy for international organizations. A vivid example of this was the response of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to a financial crisis in East Asia. In
the 1990s, many East Asian countries had followed the advice of the
IMF and opened up their economies to international finance. But due to
regulatory weaknesses, many of those countries had attracted too much
short-term foreign capital. When signs of economic weakness appeared
in some of those economies in 1997–1998, foreign lenders withdrew
their money and asset markets in East Asia collapsed. The solution to
the problem should have been foreign support for regulatory reform in
banking and finance, with governments maintaining their expenditures
and allowing their deficits to rise as a means of cushioning the shock
for the local population. The IMF offered assistance but conditioned it
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on governments cutting their expenditures and bringing unnecessary
hardship to those economies. The reason for the IMF’s condition was its
past experience in many other developing countries where government
deficits themselves had been a major culprit in causing or deepening
financial crises. However, those conditions did not apply to East Asian
countries in 1997–1998. The IMF failed to adjust its policies to specific
conditions for three main reasons: 1) the situation was complex, and
the right solution was not entirely obvious at the time; 2) allowing for
variation in IMF policies would have opened the door to demands for
exceptions in other cases where fiscal adjustment is indeed crucial; and
3) since IMF managers did not believe that their organization could easily sort out different cases, they must have felt that allowing for variation could undermine the IMF’s internal discipline.
The need for diversity of solutions across places has posed a problem for global markets. It has meant that in the economic game, the
world is not completely flat, as Thomas Friedman (2005) would suggest. Labor regulations, for example, have to take account of local circumstances in terms of social and family structure, formal insurance
options, work habits, legal systems, etc. Similarly, environmental regulations have reflected the priorities of the populations across places and
their abilities to turn their concerns into policies. Multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank tried to devise uniform
recommendations to facilitate their own decision-making processes,
and multinationals have shown preference for uniform and permissive
regulations that reduce their costs of operation. But the people in many
localities have been reluctant or unable to adapt, resulting in an uneven
distribution of global economic activity.
To sum up, the past trends in globalization have consisted of
greater integration of world markets with the help of technological
progress and policy changes across countries. However, the result has
been uneven, with or without efforts to impose uniform solutions. The
question is, what should we expect for the trends in the coming decades
given what we know about the past?
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THE COMING TRENDs
In the past, while technological developments have generally contributed to increased integration of world markets, institutional factors
—basic norms and rules such as culture and constitution—have not
always been as supportive. Also, technologies embodied in physical
capital have been relatively easy to transfer across countries, whereas
the replication of institutions and intangible technologies such as management has faced greater obstacles. However, there is increasing realization among policy analysts as well as policymakers the world over
that some essential lessons from each country’s experience must be
transferable to others if careful attention is paid to the conditions and
nuances. The consequences of this realization will likely set the trends
in globalization during the coming decades. Cross-country lessons will
be increasingly distilled to arrive at general messages, along with a host
of ifs and buts and examples for potential application in specific circumstances. This is likely to yield more practical ideas for governance
reform with minimal risk, hence further lowering the institutional barriers to globalization.
The policy reforms of the coming decades are unlikely to make
countries uniform in terms of governance and regulation, but they will
bring about greater harmony. They will enable countries to participate
in global processes and cooperate in establishing effective international
treaties and organizations that enhance fair and broad competition. At
the same time, diversity in institutions and regulatory systems is likely
to remain. Although this may entail some costs for business, it will also
serve as a source of strength for the global economy. Country differences can increase the range of options available in terms of products
and processes, allowing better potential fit between production requirements and consumers. Indeed, markets will reaffirm their great ability
to bring harmony to the diverse set of actors working differentiated conditions. And this will increase the resilience of the world economy in
the face of unforeseen shocks, for exactly the same reasons that diversity in biology ensures longevity of species.
As the means to establish and harmonize situation-specific solutions proliferate, decentralization will become a more tangible reality
for larger parts of the world. There will also be greater demands for and
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materialization of deeper democratic rule. These and all other reforms
and adaptations at the local level are likely to strengthen and broaden
the participation of national and subnational governments in forming the institutions of global governance (such as the United Nations,
the World Trade Organization, the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank of
International Settlements, and the World Court). Rather than preaching
uniformity, as the World Bank and IMF have often done in the past,
international institutions will increasingly move toward a role parallel
to that of markets: bringing harmony to a diverse set of players.
How will governments and markets deal with our current concerns
about globalization? To explore the possible answers to this question,
let’s start with the outsourcing issue, which has caused some anxiety
in recent years for workers and professionals in many countries. This
also happens to be among the easiest issues to address. To understand
the reason, first note that outsourcing will be going in all directions. So,
if some jobs are lost in the United States and outsourced to countries
where they can be done relatively more cheaply, there must also be
other tasks that are relatively more expensive in those countries and
can be outsourced to the United States. Would this type of global competition press down the U.S. wages and salaries toward those currently
prevailing in India or China? Not if American workers win the competition in their fields of specialization because of their productivity and
high quality of their services. Of course, this cannot happen in all lines
of economic activity. So, over time, part of the American labor force
may have to shift to new jobs as its comparative advantage is redefined
by global markets. Continued improvements in the labor market will
reduce the costs associated with the shift, and the remaining burden is
likely to be cushioned with the help of well-functioning private capital
and insurance markets, as well as social insurance mechanisms. Similar
trends will also be taking place in the rest of the world. In many developing countries, where the costs of adjustment have been falling mostly
on labor, there will be further institution building to diminish the hardships and share the risks. All of these effects will soften the opposition
to liberal trade around the world and thereby deepen globalization.
Another current concern about globalization is the rising inequality. Globalization has increased the returns to skills and, as a result, has
widened the gap between the rich and the poor. This is parallel to the
effects of technological and institutional changes, which have in fact
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been much stronger forces behind the increased inequality. These forces
will continue raising the rewards to skills, largely because ultimately
that is how they help incomes rise. However, the level and composition of skills are likely to change, enabling a much larger share of the
labor force to take advantage of opportunities presented by globalization and new technologies. The enhanced abilities of the governments
will also bring about more efficient, situation-specific labor regulations
that expand rewarding job opportunities for broader segments of the
population around the world. These factors should jointly help to stop
or even to reverse the recent trends in inequality.
Of course, for the enhancement and expansion in skills to take
place, there must be major reforms in education (especially curricula
and teaching methods) to facilitate the acquisition of the relevant skills.
There will be better ways to condense information in various fields and
pass them on to students, along with more general skills of communications and critical thinking. Like many other reforms, at the moment
we may not know the exact solutions that will come about in different contexts, but our efforts to improve knowledge in this area and to
experiment with possible solutions are likely to bear fruit over the coming decades.
Could the rise in global incomes be thwarted by the exhaustion of
natural resources on earth? While that is a possibility, it is by no means
a likely outcome. The incentives to find renewable and expandable substitutes for exhaustible resources are getting stronger. There are already
such substitutes available for many natural resources, though they are
not always used widely due to cost or safety consideration (such as
nuclear energy, which can be a substitute for petroleum). Another factor
that makes the picture more hopeful is the shift in the pattern of production and consumption toward products that use fewer natural resources
per dollar of their value. This trend is most vivid in the rising role of
services in the economy, which require substantially less energy than
manufacturing and agriculture. Similar trends, combined with institutional reforms in developing countries, are likely to address the environmental concerns of expanding production around the globe.
Similar responses and trends should be expected in the case of many
other problems associated with globalization. The overall picture seems
to be a hopeful one, largely based on the ability of the world community to overcome the most pressing obstacle to its economic prosperity
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at present, which is lack of sufficient knowledge and ability to spread
good practices in governance, regulation, and market development.

WHAT COMBINATIONs OF skILLs DO WE NEED IN THE
TWENTy-FIRsT CENTuRy?
There will be no shortage of decent jobs in the coming decades. To
enjoy a prosperous life, people need, among other things, good shelter,
food, medical care, education, and entertainment. Those who deliver
these products need to identify the demands and satisfy them with high
standards and low costs. To achieve this, they need high-quality and
cost-effective inputs, which must be produced by others, who in turn
depend on each other’s products and services.1 An important part of the
inputs needed at every stage is the innovative know-how to perform
tasks more effectively and improve the output. Furthermore, those who
provide such inputs will need the services of others who offer research
and advice on how innovation processes can themselves be made more
effective and innovative. At every stage, there is also a need for individuals who can facilitate the transactions and make them more reliable. Finally, there is a need for people who study the global system of
transactions at broader levels and help make it more effective. It is evident that in its entirety, this chain is very complex and, with globalization, spans the entire world economy, involving billions of jobs. Each
of those jobs can be made more productive and remunerative, which
will benefit the jobholders as well as all others who interact with them
as buyers or sellers.
In this context, the skills that one can acquire and use productively
in each country depend on the production processes already in place
and the institutional capabilities of that country. For example, in the
past, the conditions in the United States enabled it to lead in the development of new knowledge, technologies, and products (ranging from
scientific and industrial equipment to music and cinema). This position
is likely to be maintained in the first half of the twenty-first century,
and the skills most rewarded will be those that contribute to innovations. Of course, competition will increase around the world. But as
the numbers of those involved in the process rise, there will be room
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for greater specialization and focus on narrower areas where leadership
can be maintained, with some of the activities being passed on to other
countries that can perform them more effectively. This will make the
jobs more productive in the United States and in other countries, raising
incomes here and abroad.
Finally, to be effective in our jobs, we need to specialize in the tasks
that we take up, communicate effectively with those who interact with
us, and develop a practical and reasonably good understanding of the
big picture of the global economy. At the same time, we must maintain
some flexibility to be able to redefine our positions, learn new skills,
and switch to new tasks as our sources of comparative advantage shift
over time. This requires a combination of quantitative and technical
knowledge as well as communication and business skills. Many of the
specialized skills may be learned on the job or at the graduate level. In
pregraduate stages of education, we need to learn a great deal of relatively general math and sciences as well as social sciences and humanities. And, of course, in all these areas, our knowledge must include
broad perspectives on where things stand globally.

Note
1. For example, to paint the rooms in your house, you need a painter to do a neat job
while spending a minimal amount of time. This depends on the skills and incentives of the painter, as well as the equipment and the quality of paints she can use.
In particular, she needs durable brushes and painting equipment that spread paint
quickly and consistently. Producing such equipment and material in turn requires
use of appropriate inputs and the application of scientific and industrial innovations, which are produced by others, and so on and so forth.

Reference
Friedman, Thomas. 2005. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the TwentyFirst Century. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

The Authors
Sisay Asefa is a professor of economics at Western Michigan University.
Lisa D. Cook is an assistant professor of economics at James Madison College,
Michigan State University.
Hadi Salehi Esfahani is a professor of economics at the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign.
Ian Goldin is a professorial fellow at Balliol College and director of the James
Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford.
Joseph P. Joyce is a professor of economics at Wellesley College.
Susan Pozo is a professor of economics at Western Michigan University.
Kenneth A. Reinert is a professor of public policy at George Mason University.
Linda Tesar is a professor and chair of the Department of Economics at the
University of Michigan.

117

Index
The italic letters f, n, and t following a page number indicate that the subject information
of the heading is within a figure, note, or table, respectively, on that page. Double italics
indicate multiple but consecutive elements.
African countries
development models in, 19, 31n15
effect of agricultural subsidies on, 29,
33n34
exports from, 9, 30
financial dealings in, 13, 76f, 81
GDP in, 57, 58t, 59t, 60t
migration and, 20, 22f
poverty in, 3, 65
See also specifics, e.g., South Africa
Age of Mass Migration, 20
Agricultural exports, developing
countries and, 9–10, 9f, 29, 50, 67
Agriculture, 26, 30
as share of GDP internationally,
90t–91t
U.S. subsidies for, 29, 33n34, 68
Aid. See Official development assistance
(ODA)
Albania, remittances to, 22f
Altruism, remittances and, 2, 51–52
Argentina, 90t
Buenos Aires, U.S. telephone rates to,
45–46, 47f, 54n5
financial dealings in, 66, 80, 85
plant-related intellectual property
protection in, 89, 96f
trade as share of GDP, 40, 41f
Armaments, 11, 29
Asian countries, 22f, 31n15
capital accounts in, 76f, 78
financial dealings in, 66, 79, 109–110
GDP in, 58t, 59–60, 59t, 60t, 90t
mergers and acquisitions in, 79–80, 81
See also specifics, e.g., Thailand
Atlantic island countries, 22f, 30, 90t
See also specifics, e.g., Cape Verde
Australia, 87
GDP in, 57, 58t, 59t, 60t

Bangladesh, wages in, 10, 31n8
Banking
fragility of, 16, 31nn13–14, 66
loans in, 11–12, 16, 32n22, 63
systems of, 52, 74–75
Bankruptcy laws, institutional transfer
of, 63
Bond finance, equity vs., 15, 16, 31n15
Bosnia, remittances to, 22f
Brain drain, 30
health professionals and, 20–21,
32n28, 49
Brain gain, effect on rich countries, 49
Brazil, 90t
plant-related intellectual property in,
86, 89, 97f, 102
Bretton Woods Conference, monetary
arrangements, 6, 7
Brownfield investments, 79–81
Business International, corruption index
of, 64
Canada, GDP in, 57, 58t, 59t, 60t
Cape Verde, remittances to, 22f
Capital flows, 5, 11–16, 66, 73–83
bond finance and commercial bank
lending, 15–16, 31n13
equity portfolio investment, 12f,
14–15, 77f
FDI, 12–14, 12f, 74, 75–77, 77f,
79–80
stages of globalization and, 6–8
Caribbean countries. See Atlantic island
countries
Central American countries. See Latin
American countries
Chile, country data and emerging
markets in, 90t

119

120 Asefa
China, 87
development in, 7, 19
migrants from, 20, 41–42
poverty alleviation in, 65–66
Chinese Exclusion Act (U.S.), 41
Civil liberties, ratings for, 65
Climate change, global governance and,
29, 30
Colombia, 87, 90t
Colonies, 20, 80
Commercial bank lending
bond finance and, 15–16
developing countries and, 11–12, 63
noncoordination of, and market
failures, 63, 82
Communication technologies, 21
globalization and, 6, 25, 37
Internet among, for exports, 46,
48–49
telephone rates and uses in, 45–46,
47t, 51, 54nn5–6
Competition, 10, 114–115
Convention on Biological Diversity,
85–86, 88
Corruption, 64
control of, 63, 68, 106
Costa Rica, country data and emerging
markets in, 90t
Cultural property, 28–29, 50, 54n7
Currency risk, safeguards for, 16, 32n21,
64
Debt relief, 29–30, 77f, 79
Democratic Republic of the Congo, GDP
in, 57
Developed countries. See Industrialized
countries
Developing countries
attracting capital flow to, 11–30, 12f,
75–77, 77f
commercial bank lending in, 11–12,
31nn13–14
comprehensive approach to, 19,
32n25
country data and emerging markets
in, 90t–91t

human capital costs to, 49, 53
intellectual property rights in, 3–4,
25–29, 85–86, 92f, 93f, 94f, 95f
(see also Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights)
international trade by, 9, 9f, 68
major research in, 27–28, 85
reform in, and aid, 18–19
(see also Governance)
stock exchanges in, 15, 75, 76
voice of underdog in, 24, 32n29
Development, 19, 64, 65
globalization and, 48–52
ideas as influence on, 23–24
institutional, and governance, 62–65,
74, 83, 106–109
knowledge management for, 24–29,
30, 115
See also Official development
assistance (ODA)
Disaster relief, effectiveness of, 18,
32n24
Dominican Republic, remittances to,
22f, 51
Economic autarky, globalization and, 6
Economic growth
choices in achieving, 67–69
impact of education and FDI on,
32n19
institutional development and, 62–63
international GDP rates, 59–62, 59t,
61f
sources of, 60–62, 61f
Economic growth and development
role of intellectual property rights in,
25–28
See also Development
Ecuador, country data and emerging
markets in, 90t
Education, 13, 32n19
government investments in, 10, 24, 30
studies abroad for, 48–49
El Salvador, remittances to, 22f, 51
Emigration, 50, 53
remittances and, 51–52

Index 121
England, London, trans-Atlantic
telephone rates to, 45–46, 47f,
54n5
Equity portfolio investment, 31n15
capital flows and, 12f, 14–15, 17,
32n20, 77f, 79
growth of, 76–77
European countries, 32n17, 63, 68, 87
eastern, 22f, 76f, 77, 78
migrants from, 20, 61–62
western, and GDP, 57, 58t, 59, 59t, 60t
See also specifics, e.g., Italy;
Moldavia
Export industries, 11
comparative wages in, 10, 31n8
level of corruption in, 64–65
Exports, 7–11, 8f, 23, 46
developing countries and, 9–10, 9f, 29
extreme poverty and, 7–8, 9f
FAO. See Food and Agriculture
Organization
FDI. See Foreign direct investment
Financial sector
crises in, and IMF reform measures,
66, 73–75, 109–110
fragility of, and banking, 11–12,
31nn13–14
governance fears upon crises in, 80, 83
See also Capital flows
Food, controversial role of patents in, 26
Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), data, 88
Foreign aid. See Official development
assistance (ODA)
Foreign direct investment (FDI), 32n19,
64
attracting, to developing countries, 3,
21, 31n15, 83
capital flow as, 12–14, 12f, 17, 74,
75–77, 77f, 79–80
inflow of noncapital, 21, 50, 111
mergers and acquisitions in, 79–83
France, GDP in, 57
Freedom House ratings, civil liberties
and, 65

Gambia, remittances to, 22f
GATS. See General Agreement of Trade
in Services
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
GDP. See Gross domestic product
General Agreement of Trade in Services
(GATS), WTO and, 23
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), globalization and, 6–7
Geography, as source of economic
growth, 60–62, 61f
Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunizations, 27
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 27
Global markets, twenty-first-century,
105–115
coming trends, 111–114
past globalization trends, 106–110
skills needed for, 114–115
Global problem-solving
diversity of solutions in, 27, 110–112
governance and, 24, 29–30, 33n30
Global wealth
distribution of, 77–79, 78f, 90t
middle class and economic growth,
68–69
Globalization
development and, 48–52
economic dimensions of, 5–30, 37–53
(see also Ideas; Migration;
Poverty; Trade)
income inequality among nations and,
57–69
management of, 67–69
potential of, 5, 29–30, 53, 113–114
role of ideas in, 23–24, 102
role of markets in, 3, 63, 106–110
skills development and, 4, 49–50,
114–115
GNP. See Gross national product
Governance, 64, 80
global problem-solving and, 24,
29–30, 33n30, 111–112
institutional development and, 62–65,
74, 83, 106–109

122 Asefa
Governance, cont.
as source of economic growth, 61–62,
61f
Greenfield investments, 79
Gross domestic product (GDP), 15, 54n4,
88
historical development of, 7–8, 8f, 60,
60t
per capita, internationally, 57, 58t,
59–60, 59t, 62, 90t–91t
trade and, 8f, 38–41, 39f, 40f, 41f, 64
Gross national product (GNP),
remittance receipts in, 43, 43f
Haiti, remittances to, 22f, 51
Health, 10, 11, 26
effect of geography on, 61f, 62
Health professionals, brain drain of,
20–21, 32n28, 49
HIV/AIDS, 5, 21, 25, 30
Honduras, 22f, 90t
Human capital, forms of, 10, 49
Ideas
as economic dimension of
globalization, 5, 23–29, 61
protection for, 28–29, 102
(see also Intellectual property
rights)
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Immigration, 49
foreign-born population in the United
States, 41–42, 42f
Imports, 50, 54n7
effects on, 64, 68
goods as, 10–11, 11
Income inequality, 66
global wealth and, 77–79, 78f,
90t–91t, 112–113
institutional development and, 62–65
India, 19
cultural property inventory by, 28–29
FDI-related flows to, 14, 21
migrants from, 20, 21
plant-related intellectual property in,
86, 87, 89, 91t, 98f, 102

poverty alleviation in, 65–66
Indonesia, 66, 80, 90t
Industrialized countries, as control group,
81
Infectious diseases, 30
geography and, 60, 62
research in developing countries on,
17, 27–28
Information technology, globalization
and, 21, 106
Intellectual property rights
in developing countries, 3–4, 25–29
governance and, 61, 61f, 83
TRIPS and, 25, 27–28, 85
See also Patents
International Country Risk Guide,
openness measures in, 64
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 6
economic data collection by, 39–40,
54nn1–2
governance and, 24, 33n30, 63
minimizing financial instability and,
66, 74–75, 80, 109–110
International money flows. See Foreign
direct investment (FDI);
Remittances
International Union for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV), 87, 88
Internet. See under Communication
technologies
Israel, 90t
plant-related intellectual property
protection in, 89, 99f
Italy, remittance receipts in GNP of, 43,
43f, 54n3
Jamaica, remittances to, 22f
Japan, 7, 32n17, 76, 87
Jordan, remittances to, 22f
Kenya, fees for PVP in, 87
Korea, 7, 80
Latin American countries, 22f, 63
financial dealings in, 31n15, 79, 81

Index 123
Latin American countries, cont.
GDP in, 58t, 59t, 60t, 90t
opening of capital accounts in, 76f, 77
trade and, 7, 54n7
See also specifics, e.g., El Salvador
Lebanon, remittances to, 22f
Lesotho, remittances to, 22f
Mahathir, Prime Minister, 80
Malaria, 27, 28
Malawi, 21
Malaysia, control of capital flow by, 66,
80
Manufactures exports, developing
countries and, 9f
Market fundamentalism, 66
Markets
capitalization of, 15, 75
emerging, and reforms, 66, 73–75, 83
role of, in globalization, 3, 9, 63, 83
M&As. See Mergers and acquisitions
Measles Initiative, 27
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
factors that drive cross-border, 80–82
portion of, in FDI, 79–80
Mexico, 90t
financial crisis in, 66, 79
immigrants from, 41–42, 50
plant-related intellectual property in,
86, 89, 100f, 102
remittance receipts in, 43, 43f, 51, 52,
54n4
Middle Eastern countries, 3, 22f
See also specifics, e.g., Yemen
Migration, 6, 68
benefits of, 2, 30, 38, 53
cross-country data collection for,
39–40, 54n2
as economic dimension of
globalization, 2, 5, 20–23, 22f,
40–42, 48–53
(see also Remittances)
effect of technologies on, 44–45, 46,
48, 51, 53
social remittances and, 50, 54n7
See also Emigration; Immigration

Millennium Development Goals, aid
flows and effectiveness driven by,
18
MNEs. See Multinational enterprises
Moldavia, remittances to, 22f
Monopsony power, 10
Multinational enterprises (MNEs), 6,
32n17
technology access through hosting,
13–14, 31–32n16
Natural openness, impact of, 64
Natural resources, 65, 113
economic growth and, 60, 61f
Nepal, remittances to, 22f
New York City, New York, trans-Atlantic
telephone rates from, 45–46, 47f,
54n5
New Zealand, GDP in, 57, 58t, 59t, 60t
Nicaragua, remittances to, 22f
Nostalgic trade, 50
ODA. See Official development
assistance
OECD. See Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
Official development assistance (ODA),
5, 17–20
effectiveness of, 18, 20, 30, 32n23
flow of, to developing countries, 12f,
17–18, 32n24
Openness
measures of, 64, 75, 76f
as source of economic growth, 61–62,
61f, 65
trade policies of, 64–65
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), 75
aid pledged vs. actually given, 17–18
economic data collection by, 39–40
Pacific island countries, 20, 22f, 90t
See also specifics, e.g., Indonesia
Patent ladders, 27
Patents, 26, 27, 86–87
See also Plant patents

124 Asefa
PBR. See Plant breeders’ rights
Pharmaceuticals
imports of, and public health, 10–11
licensing of, and global health crises,
28, 33nn31–32
patents and, 27, 85
Plant breeders’ rights (PBR), 86, 87
Plant patents, 86–102
applications, grants and rejections of
U.S., 89, 93f
evidence for, 88–89, 92f, 96f, 97f, 98f,
99f, 100f, 102
foreign holders of U.S., 87–88,
90t–91t, 92f, 93f
U.S., vs. PVP elsewhere, 87, 92,
96–97, 99–100
Plant variety protection (PVP)
certifications for, 87, 88
evidence for, 88–89, 92f, 96f, 97f, 99f,
100f
Policy reform, 74, 106
economies in emerging markets and,
66, 75–77, 83
(see also Washington Consensus)
migration and, 49, 68
Poverty
extreme, and trade, 7–8, 8f
impact of globalization on, 1–3, 38,
65–67
Poverty alleviation, 63
disaster relief and, 18, 32n24
FDI and, 12, 13–14, 31n15, 32n19
globalization as vehicle for, 30, 53,
65–66
in-country policies and, 13–14, 18–
20, 19–20
intellectual property rights and, 28–29
social remittances and, 50, 54n7
trade and, 8–10, 29, 31nn6–7, 67
Productivity, 10
competition to spur, 114–115
government reform influence on,
18–19
Property rights. See Intellectual property
rights

Public health, 25, 30
intellectual property and, 27–28
pharmaceutical imports and, 10–11
PVP. See Plant variety protection
Regulatory reform. See Policy reform
Remittances
altruism and, 2, 51–52
flow of, to developing countries, 12f,
21–23, 22f, 30, 51–52
historical patterns of, 42–43, 43f
tracking, by telephone, 46, 54n6
See also Social remittances
Research, 85
government investments in, 24, 68
major diseases and, 17, 27–28
personnel employed in,
internationally, 90t–91t
Research and development (R&D),
32n17, 85
expenditures for, as share of GDP
internationally, 88, 90t–91t
M&A gains in, 81–82
Repsol, FDI by, 80
Roll Back Malaria Partnership, 27
Samoa, remittances to, 22f
San Francisco, California, cross-country
telephone line capacity to, 46
Saudi Arabia, natural resources and civil
liberties in, 65
Service exports, 9f, 11, 23
Skills development, globalization and
need for, 4, 49–50, 114–115
Slavery, underdevelopment of African
countries and, 65
Social remittances, as influence on
economic development, 50, 54n7
Somalia, brain drain from, 49
South Africa, 15, 90t
Statistics, coordination of data collection
for, 39–40, 54nn1–2
Stock markets in developing countries,
15, 75, 76, 80

Index 125
Supranational organizations. See
specifics, e.g.,United Nations;
International Monetary Fund;
Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development;
World Bank
Taiwan, 7, 91t
plant-related intellectual property
protection in, 87, 89, 101f
Tajikistan, remittances to, 22f
Tariffs, 29
See also General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Technology transfer, 82
development and, 13, 25, 50
innovation in economic openness, 61,
61f
Telecommunications. See under
Communication technologies
Thailand, 66, 80, 87, 90t
Tonga, remittances to, 22f
Trade
as economic dimension of
globalization, 8–11, 30, 37, 50
extreme poverty and, 7–8, 8f
liberalization of, 44, 67–68, 74, 106–
107
(see also General Agreement of
Trade in Services; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
policies of openness for, 64–65, 66
as share of GDP, 38–41, 39f, 40f, 41f
See also Exports; Imports
Trade barriers, 7, 29, 64
removing, and growth, 66, 106
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), 25,
27–28, 85, 86
Trade secrets, plant protection through,
86, 87
Trademarks, plant protection through,
86, 87
Traditional Knowledge Digital Libraries,
India, 28–29

Transparency International, corruption
index of, 64
Transportation technologies, 51
geography and, 60–61
global shipping rates, 44–45, 45f, 46
globalization and, 6, 7, 31n4, 37, 106
TRIPS. See Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR). GDP in, 58t, 59t, 60t
United Kingdom, 76
See also England
United Nations (U.N.)
Conference on Trade and
Development, 31n6
Convention on Biological Diversity,
88
economic data collection by, 39–40,
54n1
Food and Agriculture Organization,
88
governance of, 24, 33n30
Millennium Development Goals of,
18
United States, 54n1, 54n7, 66, 87
foreign-born population in, 41–42,
42f, 48
GDP and trade in, 38–40, 39f, 40f
GDP in, 57, 58t, 59t, 60t
trans-Atlantic telephone rates from
New York, 45–46, 47f, 54n5
UPOV. See International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of
Plants
U.S. law and legislation, 41, 42, 63
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 86,
87, 102n2
U.S. Treasury, 74
Utility patents, 86, 102n1
applications, grants and rejections of
U.S., 89, 94f
categories of, granted to developing
countries, 89, 95f
evidence for, 88, 92f, 96f, 97f, 98f,
99f, 100f, 101f

126 Asefa
Vanuatu, remittances to, 22f
Vietnam, 13, 14
Wages, 9–10, 13
Washington Consensus, 66
global financial flows and, 73–75
phases of, 3, 73–74
Williamson, John, 66, 80
WIPO. See World Intellectual Property
Organization
World Bank
approach to foreign aid, 19, 32n25
on banking, 16, 31nn13–14
economic data collection by, 39–40,
54n1
globalization and, 6, 110
governance and, 24, 33n30, 63
World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), data, 88
World Trade Organization (WTO), 88
achievements of, 25, 27–28, 32
China’s membership in, 41–42
pharmaceutical licensing and, 28,
33nn31–32
World War II, as data collection
watershed, 39–40
Yemen remittances to, 22f
YPF, sale of, 80

About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists;
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.

127

